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ECONOMIC INSTRUMENTS FOR NONPOINT SOURCE WATER 




The  management  of  nonpoint  source  water  pollution  presents  an  immense  challenge  to 
economists  and  policy  makers  alike.  A  complex  array  of  physical,  economic,  political  and 
institutional  barriers  lie  between  theoretically  appealing  textbook  prescriptions  and  their 
transition into successful real-world solutions. Underlying beliefs about property rights, interest 
group politics and the transaction costs associated with designing and implementing successful 
measures have all played a particularly critical role. Building on the theoretical literature and the 
lessons  provided  by  the  practical  use  of  economic  instruments  for  nonpoint  source  water 
pollution management around the world, this paper considers these issues in the context of the 
Swan-Canning river system in Perth. Four innovative economic instruments for the management 
of nonpoint source nutrient pollution in that system are discussed: auctioned best management 
practice  payments;  best  management  practice  incentive  charges;  an  urban  nonpoint  source 
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In 1209, Genghis Khan is said to have decreed that his people keep their stock out of the rivers of 
Karakorum to preserve water quality (McMullen 2002). Nearly 800 years later, however, the 
management of nonpoint source water pollution has become a far more challenging proposition 
for democratic governments around the world. While a combination of traditional regulatory and 
economic mechanisms have made major inroads into point source water pollution from large 
enterprises, this is far from being the case with nonpoint source water pollution. The latter is now 
a very serious problem, for not only are nonpoint sources notoriously resistant to public 
intervention, but in many cases the aggregate level of pollution they cause significantly exceeds 
that of point sources (Faeth 2000).
1  
Yet despite widespread acknowledgment of the significant threat posed by nonpoint source 
pollution for water quality in many major catchments and river systems, generations of 
successive governments have failed to follow the unlikely lead provided by Genghis Khan. 
Legislative and regulatory approaches to this form of pollution are thin on the ground. 
Furthermore, the uptake of economic instruments has been equally unimpressive. While 
economists have proudly espoused the merits of various economic instruments for addressing 
point source pollution 
2 since Arthur Pigou’s seminal 1920 publication The Economics of 
Welfare, their suitability for addressing nonpoint source pollution remains questionable at best.  
In general, governments have been reluctant to adopt coercive measures to address nonpoint 
source water pollution. Suasive measures such as education and information programs aimed at 
communicating the nature of the environmental problem and encouraging the voluntary adoption 
of best management practices have historically led the way in most countries, including 
Australia.  
Recent developments, however, suggest a policy change may be in the wind. Several major 
government decisions indicate that the demand for economic solutions to nonpoint source water 
pollution (and environmental problems more generally) is gradually increasing.
3 The failure of 
suasive measures to bring about desired reductions in nonpoint source water pollution, combined 
with increasing pressure to deliver cost-effective environmental solutions, appear to have shifted 
the spotlight onto potential economic solutions. 
While demand for new and improved economic remedies to nonpoint source water pollution 
has grown, it is fair to say that supply has not. Indeed, it is just twenty years since the first 
systematic analysis of the role of economics in nonpoint pollution control was undertaken by 
Griffin and Bromley (1982) and most analysis in this field has only occurred during the last 
decade. During this time a number of economic instruments have been proposed. Most of these 
have failed to make the transition from the ‘ideal world’ that forms the basis for their 
examination in the economic texts to widespread practical application in the real world.  
                                                 
1 It is estimated that 82 per cent of total nitrogen discharges and 84 per cent of total phosphorus discharges into 
waterways in the United States come from nonpoint sources (Faeth 2000). There is little reason to doubt that the 
comparative figures for Australia would be much different. NSW EPA (2002) for instance, suggest that nonpoint 
sources contribute 80% of phosphorus and 90% of nitrogen pollution in the Warragamba catchment in Sydney.  
2 It should be noted that despite the continual affirmations of many economists that economic instruments provide 
the most efficient approach to managing point source water pollution, the practical experience with emission charges 
and tradable emission permits may be considered modest at best (Hahn 1989; Hahn and Hester 1989; Stavins 2001). 
3 This may be evidenced by the $10 million portion of the 2001 National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
earmarked for pilots of various economic instruments around Australia.   
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This paper looks at some of the reasons why these instruments have failed to attract the eye 
of environmental managers and policy makers. More specifically, the physical, economic, 
political and institutional challenges posed by excessive nonpoint source water pollution are 
examined and several potential solutions are considered. 
The paper is presented in three general parts. The first part, Section 2, discusses the nature of 
nonpoint source pollution and the implications of the inherent characteristics of this form of 
pollution for policy design.  
The second part comprises Sections 3 and 4 and investigates the contribution that economics 
has made to the management of nonpoint source water pollution. Section 3 provides a summary 
of a range of economic instruments for addressing nonpoint source water pollution. This section 
does not aim to provide a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical merits of all of these 
instruments, focusing instead on those instruments that have either received the greatest attention 
in the economic literature or have been widely adopted in practice. Where applicable, a 
discussion of the practical performance of these instruments is provided. Section 4 looks at the 
lessons that may be gleaned from the real world approach to nonpoint source water pollution. It 
considers why governments have generally preferred suasive measures to economic instruments. 
Three elements in particular are proposed as having played a critical role in shaping the way in 
which policy makers and governments address the problem of nonpoint source water pollution – 
underlying beliefs about the property rights to pollute, interest group politics and the high 
transaction costs associated with designing and implementing efficient and environmentally 
effective economic instruments. 
The third part of this paper comprises Sections 5 and 6 and considers the contribution that 
economic instruments may make to the management of excessive nonpoint source nitrogen and 
phosphorus emissions into the Swan-Canning river system in Perth, Western Australia. Drawing 
on the lessons provided earlier in the paper, four innovative instruments are proposed. The first 
two of these instruments are aimed at increasing the adoption of best management practices 
(BMP) by nonpoint source polluters. The first, a system of auctioned grants for the voluntary 
improvement of management practices is based on the current underlying beliefs regarding the 
property rights for nonpoint source emissions. The second, a system of BMP incentive charges, is 
based on the principle that the nonpoint source polluters should pay for their emissions. While it 
is clear that such an approach would initially face strong opposition from nonpoint source 
polluters and their lobby groups, the design of this instrument is aimed at mimimising this 
opposition through gradually phasing in BMP requirements and charges for non-compliance and 
recycling revenue to the affected industry to reward positive environmental action. The third 
economic instrument to be examined is a system of emission offsets targeted at urban residential 
nonpoint emissions. In recognition of the potential for high transaction costs to erode the benefits 
from such a scheme, a regionally managed offset bank system is considered. A fourth instrument, 
based on converting groups of individual nonpoint source polluters into single point sources, 
although not currently practical due to the high policy transaction costs associated with 
introducing the appropriate institutional arrangements for its successful implementation, is also 
discussed due to its potential in the longer term. 
In Section 7, conclusions are drawn on the contribution of economic instruments to nonpoint 
source water pollution in general, and more specifically for the Swan-Canning river system.  
4 
2. The nature of nonpoint source pollution 
The inherent characteristics of nonpoint source pollution and the implications of these 
characteristics for policy design are well documented (Shortle and Horan 2001; Shortle and 
Abler 1997; Shortle and Abler 1994; Tomasi et al 1994; Dosi and Moretto 1994; Dosi and 
Tomasi 1994; Xepapadeas 1994). 
Unlike emissions from point sources, which enter the river system at discrete and 
identifiable locations, emissions from nonpoint sources follow unobservable, indirect and diffuse 
pathways into the system. Emissions from a farm or urban parkland are typical examples. As a 
consequence, assigning responsibility for and measuring emissions from individual nonpoint 
source polluters becomes both extremely difficult and uncertain.
4 This uncertainty surrounding 
the size of emissions from individual nonpoint sources and the degree of environmental damage 
caused by these emissions poses a considerable problem for the policy maker. As Shortle and 
Abler (1997) suggest, it is politically difficult for the policy maker to require nonpoint source 
polluters to undertake potentially costly actions to reduce emissions when it is difficult to 
demonstrate the public benefits of such actions. In some cases it may be highly uncertain as to 
whether the public benefits of such actions even outweigh the costs. Furthermore, experience in 
the United States suggests that such requirements would not only need to match up with general 
perceptions of fairness but also be legally defensible. As will be seen in the following section, 
these problems have played a major role in shaping policy actions to address nonpoint source 
water pollution, shifting the focus away from instruments based on the polluter pays principle 
towards moral suasion and government funded subsidisation of improved management practices.  
A further difficulty for the policy maker relates to the characteristics of the nonpoint source 
polluters themselves. In most river systems there are likely to be a large number of small 
heterogeneous nonpoint sources. This has a number of implications for instrument choice. First, 
individual emissions cannot be inferred from ambient nutrient concentrations as the later are 
determined by the joint contributions of many unmeasured nonpoint sources. Second, the 
transaction costs associated with monitoring emissions at the individual polluter level (if this 
were to become technically feasible) and of administering measures aimed at reducing nonpoint 
source pollution are very high. These costs increase even further the greater the degree of 
heterogeneity between nonpoint source polluters. Unfortunately, in most instances variation in 
site characteristics has a considerable influence on the likely environmental effectiveness and 
cost of specific actions. In many cases this precludes the use of uniform technological 
prescriptions, instead demanding the adoption of actions tailored to the characteristics of each 
individual polluter.  
A final complication that arises with nonpoint source pollution relates to the uncertainty 
surrounding the way in which nonpoint source polluters will respond to given policies. One of 
the main arguments that supports the use of economic instruments over regulatory approaches to 
pollution control is that the polluter holds a greater degree of information about their marginal 
abatement costs than does the policy maker. With large point source polluters this assumption is 
likely to hold. It is commonly accepted that they have the level of technical expertise and 
resources available to determine the various types of abatement options available to them. They 
                                                 
4 While science is making constant advances in terms of being able to measure the level of emissions from nonpoint 
sources, the current reality is that doing so in most cases is still either technically infeasible or prohibitively 
expensive.  
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also have a reasonable understanding of the cost of implementing these options. The same cannot 
be said for nonpoint source polluters. Take the example of a small farm. Without ever having 
been required to consider or undertake pollution abatement it is unlikely that the farmer will have 
made any effort to try to estimate the costs of various abatement options. Moreover, they may not 
even be aware what options are available to them. The level of technical expertise and time 
required to make such estimations is simply not available in most cases. As a consequence, 
polluters cannot be counted on to respond to economic incentives to undertake pollution 
abatement. This suggests that an education/information program and ongoing technical extension 
aimed at polluters should be included in any policy mix that includes economic instruments for 
nonpoint source pollution control. 
Together, these characteristics of nonpoint source water pollution present a considerable 
challenge to both policy makers and economists. Nevertheless, over the last twenty years a 
substantial and growing body of literature has developed, seeking to identify suitable economic 
instruments for managing nonpoint source water pollution. The following section provides a 
review and a critical analysis of the literature. Particular focus is placed on the potential of a 
number of proposed economic instruments to translate theory into practice. Where applicable, a 
discussion of the practical performance of these instruments is also provided. 
3.  Economic instruments for nonpoint source pollution control  
Economic instruments aimed at addressing point source water pollution, such as emission 
charges and tradable emission permits, are designed to use measured emissions from individual 
polluters as their compliance base. This luxury is not available when addressing nonpoint source 
water pollution. Rather, an alternative compliance base that is both correlated with actual 
emissions from individual polluters and enforceable is required. The search for a suitable 
compliance base has been the focus of attention in the nonpoint source literature. Three basic 
options have been proposed: inputs or management practices that are correlated with emission 
levels; ambient pollution levels; and sophisticated emission proxies.  
        A range of economic instruments for nonpoint source water pollution control, using these 
suggested compliance bases have been proposed. These include: incentive mechanisms aimed 
directly at input use, such as input taxes and subsidies; incentive mechanisms based on ambient 
pollution levels, such as ambient taxes, random fines and nonpoint source tournaments; and 
instruments based on estimated emissions from nonpoint source polluters, such as estimated 
emissions trading (point/nonpoint trading).
5 A summary of these instruments is provided in Table 
1. A discussion of a number of these instruments and how they have fared in practice is provided 
below. 
This section does not aim to provide a comprehensive discussion of the theoretical merits of 
all of these instruments, focusing instead on those instruments that have either received the 
greatest attention in the economic literature or have been widely adopted in practice. A more 
detailed discussion of a broader range of instruments may be found in Shortle and Abler (1997) 
and Shortle and Horan (2001). 
 
                                                 
5 The use of emission proxies as a base was first proposed by Griffin and Bromley (1982). The paper in which they 
proposed this ‘indirect approach’ is considered to be the first systematic analysis of the role of economics in 
nonpoint pollution control. 
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Table 1 Nonpoint pollution control instruments 
  Compliance measure 
Mechanism  Inputs/Practices  Emissions Proxies  Ambient Taxes 
Taxes/subsidies  Charge on fertiliser 
purchase. 
Charges on modeled 
nutrient loadings. 
Ambient taxes. 
  Cost-sharing or other 
subsidies for inputs or 
practices that reduce 
pollution. 
Charges on nutrient 
applications in excess of 
crop needs. 
 
  Crop land retirement 
subsidies. 
Charges on estimated net 
soil loss. 
 
Standards  Restrictions on fertiliser 
application rates. 
Restrictions on modeled 
nutrient loadings. 
 
  Mandatory use of 
pollution control 
practices. 
Regulations on nutrient 
applications in excess of 
crop needs. 
 
Markets  Input trading.  Estimated emissions 
trading – point/nonpoint 
and nonpoint/nonpoint. 
 
Contracts  Land retirement 
contracts. 
   
  Conservation or 
nutrient management 
practices contracts. 
   
Liability Rules  Negligence liability 
rules. 
  Strict or negligence 
liability rules. 
Source: Shortle and Horan (2001) 
Input based instruments 
Inputs into the production process and management practices undertaken by the polluters are 
often correlated with emission levels (Shortle and Horan 2001). This relationship enables inputs 
and management practices to be used as an alternate base for pollution control instruments. 
        Several studies have provided theoretical support for the use of input taxes for nonpoint 
pollution control. Griffin and Bromley (1982) are accredited as being the first to examine the 
theoretical merits of such an approach. Assuming nonstochastic nonpoint externalities and 
perfectly estimated emissions they demonstrated that taxing inputs (or management practices) 
that are known to increase nonpoint source pollution (or conversely a subsidy on all inputs or 
management practices which will reduce it) is theoretically capable of producing the same 
outcomes as optimal pigouvian taxes and subsidies. Shortle and Dunn (1994) considered the 
efficiency of such an approach taking into account the uncertainty that surrounds nonpoint source 
emissions and their impact on ambient pollution levels and demonstrated that an efficient 
solution could still be achieved as long as firm specific taxes were applied on all inputs that 
contributed to the ambient pollution level.  
Delivering the efficiency benefits that such an approach offers in theory is extremely 
difficult in practice. It is both administratively complex and costly to monitor and verify all the 
inputs and management practices for each nonpoint source polluter in a catchment. Moreover, 
uncertainties surrounding the relationship between input use and the actual impact on ambient 
pollution levels are often considerable (Shortle and Abler 1997).   
        In recognition of these practical obstacles a number of related options have been suggested. 
The first involves truncating the input tax/subsidy system to a subset of inputs/management  
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practices that remain closely correlated with the level of emissions but are less costly to monitor. 
While reducing policy transaction costs 
6 this approach may have undesired ‘spillover’ impacts 
such as encouraging substitution into other environmentally damaging inputs (Randhir and Lee 
1997). The second option involves shifting the basis for compliance monitoring away from 
observed use by the nonpoint source polluter to the point of sale of the input or even to the 
manufacturer of the polluting product covered by the scheme (Shortle and Horan 2001). While 
this approach has been used to control pesticide application it has received relatively little 
support in the nonpoint source economic literature as it fails to provide a transparent signal to 
nonpoint source polluters about the external costs of their production decisions (Shortle and 
Horan 2001). 
Despite their theoretical appeal, input taxes aimed at reducing nonpoint source water 
pollution have rarely been adopted in practice. The Scandinavian counties have been the 
exception. Sweden imposes significant sales taxes on commercial fertilisers containing nitrogen 
and phosphorus while Norway has previously imposed sales taxes on the nitrogen component of 
fertiliser (Vatn et al 2002; Shortle and Abler 1997). To date, the imposition of fertiliser taxes in 
these countries has failed to achieve the desired environmental outcomes (Ecotec 2001). This 
lack of success may be attributed to the fact that fertiliser consumption tends to be relatively 
unresponsive to price changes (i.e. it is highly price inelastic). Subsequently, very large taxes are 
required if the desired reductions in fertiliser applications are to be achieved. Imposing taxes of 
this magnitude tends to generate strong opposition from affected stakeholders, however, and 
rarely garners the necessary political support for their introduction. In Norway for instance, it 
was estimated that a tax of between 100 and 300 per cent would be necessary to reduce the 
incidence of algal blooms (Simonsen 1989 cited in Vatn et al 2002). Strong lobbying from 
farmer groups concerned about the impact of the tax on their financial viability resulted in a 
fertiliser tax of just eight per cent being introduced in 1992. After continuing parliamentary 
debate (stretching over nearly a decade) it was decided that the eight per cent tax increased farm 
costs by too much and was failing to provide a sufficient level of environmental benefit. It was 
finally removed in 1999 (Vatn et al 2002).   
Analogous to input taxes, input subsidies (in their textbook form) are payments made to a 
polluter for each unit of emissions that they reduce. In comparison to input taxes, economists 
have tended to strongly oppose the adoption of input subsidies as a form of pollution control. 
Their primary concerns relate to the suggestion that subsidies may lead to long-run dynamic 
inefficiency and actually increase overall levels of pollution by providing a financial stimulus for 
the polluting industry and encouraging new entrants (Baumol and Oates 1988; O’Shea 2002). A 
further objection is based on the grounds that subsidies are diametrically opposed to the polluter 
pays principle (Panayotou 1998). 
The term subsidy is used much more widely in the popular economic literature, however, 
and refers to any form of payment made to a polluter to encourage them to undertake 
management actions that will reduce their level of emissions (Industry Commission 1997; Barde 
1997). In this broader sense subsidies include cost sharing, grants, low interest loans and tax 
                                                 
6 As explained in section 5 of this paper, policy transaction costs include the costs associated with: research, 
information gathering and analysis; enactment of enabling legislation (including lobbying and public participation 
costs); design and implementation of the policy (including costs of regulatory delay); support and administration of 
the on-going program; contracting costs; monitoring/detection costs (of both the efficiency of the outcome and the 
level of compliance); and prosecution/inducement costs (McCann and Easter 1998; 2002).  
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concessions. If considered in these forms, subsidies are one of the most commonly adopted 
economic instruments for nonpoint source pollution management.  
In the United States, for example, a number of voluntary programs that provide cost-share 
payments for approved management practices are run at both the federal and state level and form 
the backbone of efforts to reduce nonpoint source water pollution in that country. These include 
the: continuous signup component of the Conservation Reserve Program (CRP); Environmental 
Quality Incentives Program (EQIP); Agricultural Management Assistance Program (AMA); 
Wetlands Reserve Program (WRP); and the Soil and Water Conservation Assistance Program 
(SWCA). Cost-share assistance ranges from 50 per cent for the continuous signup component of 
the CRP through to 75 per cent for the other programs (USDA 2002a; USDA 2002b; USDA 
2002c; USDA 2002d; USDA 2002e).
7 
The approach adopted in Australia is similar to that in the United States with cost-share 
assistance and other forms of subsidies (including tax deductions and low interest loans) 
provided through the Commonwealth funded Natural Heritage Trust (NHT).  
The strong uptake of this form of instrument might suggest that it is capable of delivering on 
both environmental and economic grounds. This is not necessarily the case. As cost-share 
programs are not directly aimed at internalising the externality caused by the polluter’s 
management decisions they are unlikely to deliver the same level of economic efficiency gains as 
many other economic instruments. Moreover, being voluntary, they do not guarantee significant 
environmental improvements, as the proportion of total polluters participating in the program 
may be small.
8  
So, why has this form of instrument tended to spearhead the attack on nonpoint source water 
pollution? The answer is essentially political. Subsidies are not based on the polluter pays 
principle. As such, they enjoy strong support from affected nonpoint source polluters and avoid 
political confrontations regarding changes to property rights. The impact that underlying beliefs 
about property rights has on instrument choice is discussed in greater detail in Section 4 of this 
paper.  
Ambient based instruments 
Ambient based instruments treat the problem of nonpoint source water pollution as one of ‘moral 
hazard’ 
9 and are aimed at inducing efficient pollution abatement decisions from individual 
nonpoint source polluters. Since first suggested by Kathleen Segerson in 1988 a substantial body 
of theoretical literature that explores various types of ambient based economic instruments has 
evolved.  
         Segerson (1988) proposed that nonpoint source polluters receive subsidies if ambient 
pollution levels were measured to be below a desired target level and be taxed if they were 
                                                 
7 The SWCA is the only on of these programs subject to competitive bidding. While such bidding is a feature of the 
CRP it does not apply for the continuous signup portion of the program. The competitive bidding element of the 
EQIP was removed as part of changes made in the 2002 US Farm Bill. 
8 Polluters may be unwilling to participate in such programs due to the amount of time and effort required on their 
behalf (Humphries et al 2002). 
9 Moral hazard assumes that the characteristics of individual polluters are assumed to be known with certainty while 
their actions, including the level of pollution abatement they undertake, are not.  
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measured to be above. Under a number of restrictive conditions
10 it was demonstrated that this 
model could deliver an economically efficient environmental outcome. In practice, Segerson’s 
model faces a number of barriers. The largest relates to the perceived fairness of applying this 
approach. The model does not discriminate between those who have undertaken costly actions to 
reduce their emissions and those who have not. This feature would be likely to engender 
considerable opposition from affected polluters and acts to limit the political appeal of the 
instrument.  
Other ambient based economic instruments face similar barriers. One such approach, 
developed by Xepapadeas (1991), is centered on a system of random fines whereby a polluter is 
chosen at random and fined if ambient pollution levels are measured to be above the desired 
target level. While this instrument would provide some incentive to polluters to jointly undertake 
pollution control to avoid the risk of being punished, it is also politically unpalatable. In the 
extreme it could result in firms who have met best management practice pollution abatement 
requirements being fined while others who have undertaken no pollution abatement remain 
unpunished (Govindasamy et al 1994).  
In response to the potential problems faced by the ambient based instruments proposed by 
Segerson and Xepapadeas, Govindasamy et al (1994) proposed the use of nonpoint tournaments 
whereby polluters are ranked based on the level of pollution control they have undertaken. 
Bottom ranked polluters are penalised if ambient pollution levels are above socially desired 
levels and top ranked polluters are rewarded if ambient pollution levels are below socially 
desirable levels. By basing penalties and rewards on actions rather than emissions the 
information requirement for the policy maker is substantially reduced and political acceptability 
increased.  How polluters would be ranked and whether or not they would find this system 
acceptable remains uncertain. Moreover, whether it would deliver environmental benefits greater 
than the transaction costs associated with implementing such a radical system is questionable. 
Not surprisingly, despite having some theoretical appeal, ambient based instruments are yet 
to be applied in practice (Shortle and Abler 1997). The high cost and uncertainty of monitoring 
ambient pollution levels and the significant political limitations of the approach have been put 
forward as two likely reasons for this outcome (Shortle and Abler 1997; Shortle and Horan 
2001). Lack of stakeholder and political support appears to be a severe concern. It stems from 
concerns regarding fairness (or lack of it) as individuals are taxed based on the actions of the 
group rather than their own pollution control efforts. These and other concerns have led analysts 
to suggest that ambient instruments may only be suitable in restrictive circumstances where: the 
watershed is small; polluters are homogenous; water quality may be monitored reliably and at 
low cost; and where there are short time lags between the polluting activity and the impact on 
water quality (Weersink et al 1998 cited in Shortle and Horan 2001). Given the restrictive nature 
of these conditions and the political opposition that such an approach would be likely to 
engender, ambient based instruments must be considered to be of no practical interest at this 
stage. 
Emission proxies 
Emission proxies are estimates of emissions based on observed behaviour. Simple proxies may 
be based on the expected emissions resulting from a single input use, such as fertiliser 
                                                 
10 For instance, it is assumed that polluters are able to observe and control their own emissions as well as having 
knowledge on how the actions of other polluters will affect the ambient pollution level.  
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application. More sophisticated proxies may use models which try and replicate the impact that 
various management choices will have on emissions in a particular physical environment.
11 If 
emission proxies are considered to closely predict actual emissions the range of economic 
instruments used to address point source pollution may also be considered by the policy maker 
for the management of nonpoint source pollution. These include emission charges and emissions 
trading. Emission charges based on proxies have yet to be adopted in practice. Uncertainty over 
the ability of emission proxies to reflect actual emissions and strong resistance from nonpoint 
source polluters to such an approach substantially erode their political appeal. In comparison, 
nonpoint source emission trading based on emission proxies has been applied in practice, 
predominantly in the United States. A detailed discussion of this instrument is provided below.  
Nonpoint source emissions trading 
The concept of nonpoint source emissions trading has evolved as a consequence of both the 
institutional context of the United States water pollution control laws and the failure of early 
point source emissions trading programs for water pollution control (Shortle and Abler 1997). 
Emissions trading programs to address point source water pollution were first introduced in the 
United States in response to stringent regulations placed on emissions from point source polluters 
under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 1972.  
        The first of these trading programs, the Fox River tradable discharge scheme, was 
introduced in 1981 amid considerable fanfare from environmental economists. Modeling 
undertaken prior to the implementation of the scheme suggested that trading would deliver 
annual cost savings of around US$7 million over a more prescriptive regulatory approach (US 
EPA 1996). These savings did not eventuate. In fact, the actual cost savings have been minimal 
and in all the time the scheme has been in existence just one trade has taken place (Hahn 1989; 
Kraemer and Banholzer 1999). The problems of the Fox River scheme have been repeated in 
point source water pollution markets all over the United States (Stavins 2001; Environomics 
1999). ‘Thin’ markets 
12 and a lack of variability in polluters’ marginal abatement costs were 
considered to be two of the reasons for this outcome.   
The inclusion of nonpoint source polluters in tradable emission markets was seen as a 
possible solution to both of these problems and as a way of improving the overall efficiency of 
the market (Shortle and Horan 2001). The potential for improved efficiency derives from both 
the increase in market ‘depth’ as a result of including a large number of nonpoint source polluters 
and from the fact that nonpoint source polluters tend to have lower marginal abatement costs than 
point source polluters (US EPA 1996; Shortle and Abler 1997). While point source polluters may 
require the introduction of new and potentially expensive technological methods to reduce their 
emissions, nonpoint source polluters may be able to reduce theirs through relatively simple and 
low cost changes in management practices, such as reducing fertiliser application rates. The fact 
that point source emissions have been the focus of regulators attentions over a longer period than 
nonpoint source emissions has also played a role in creating the difference in marginal abatement 
costs. While the easy yards may have already been taken with point source emission reductions 
this may not be the case for nonpoint sources that have largely remained off the environmental 
authorities radar screen.  
                                                 
11 The Universal Soil Loss Equation is an example of a sophisticated proxy. 
12 ‘Thin’ markets refers to markets where there are insufficient potential trading partners to generate the level of 
trade necessary to deliver efficiency gains.  
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These factors provide a strong economic rationale for including nonpoint sources in tradable 
emission markets. The ability to translate the potential benefits that such a scheme offers into 
practice is not without considerable challenge, however.  In particular, complex technical, 
economic, scientific, regulatory and institutional issues all need to be addressed.  
The most important of these issues relates to how to design the system so that trades can 
occur between polluters with measurable emissions (point source polluters) and those with 
unobservable emissions (nonpoint source polluters). That is, how can the market operate when 
the same commodity (observed emissions reductions) cannot be traded? To get around this 
problem it is necessary for the policy maker to estimate what the likely emissions reductions of 
different management practices for nonpoint sources would be (through fieldwork and detailed 
biophysical models) and to grant permits on this basis. This poses a considerable challenge, may 
be costly to undertake and may not provide proxies that can be adopted with a great level of 
certainty.  Complicating matters even further is the fact that in most cases there is likely to be a 
great degree of heterogeneity between nonpoint sources. Due to temporal and spatial differences 
the emissions reduction as a result of the same change in management practices by one source 
may differ from another source elsewhere in the catchment.  
One way of addressing these concerns is to introduce trading ratios for trades between point 
and nonpoint polluters. In general, trading ratios need to be carefully determined as they have the 
potential to erode incentives for trade between point and nonpoint source polluters if set too high. 
If trading ratios are set too high, transaction costs are likely to increase as it becomes more 
difficult for willing trading partners to be found in the market. High transaction costs are 
important to the efficient operation of the market as they have the potential to diminish cost-
efficiencies gained through trading. While this is an issue for all trading schemes it is of 
particular importance to point/nonpoint trading schemes due to the large number of small 
nonpoint source market participants. Given that changed management practices for most 
nonpoint source emitters is only likely to result in a small emissions reduction (compared to that 
required from point source emitters) it is likely that the point source will need to coordinate 
trades with multiple nonpoint source emitters.  
Even when transaction costs are low, there are no guarantees that a sufficient level of trade 
to generate efficiency gains will automatically result. Where nonpoint source polluters are not 
subject to the same regulatory constraints as the point source polluters they may be hesitant to 
enter into a trade, even where it would be consistent with their profit maximising behavior, 
simply to avoid the time and cost taken up by negotiations with the point source emitter. And 
where trades are entered into, questions regarding the security of environmental outcomes that 
they will deliver remain as nonpoint source polluters may fail to undertake the management 
actions required to deliver the agreed reduction in emissions. 
13  
As a result of the range of scientific, economic and regulatory challenges outlined above, 
fully fledged nonpoint emissions trading programs, whereby trading occurs until an equilibrium 
market price is achieved, are yet to be applied in practice. While interest in including nonpoint 
source water polluters in existing point source emission trading programs in the United States has 
                                                 
13 To avoid this potential problem the US EPA (1996) suggest that compliance for any nonpoint sources should be 
determined by a regulatory authority and based on reasonable assurance that the nonpoint sources will comply with 
the provisions of the trade. Reasonable assurance, as defined by the US EPA (1996) means that the proposed 
nonpoint source controls are: technically feasible; specific to the pollution of concern; implemented according to a 
schedule and within a reasonable time period; and supported by reliable delivery mechanisms and adequate funding.  
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increased dramatically over the last decade, in practice trading schemes have tended to amount to 
little more than relatively simple offset schemes. In these schemes any increase in emissions 
resulting from new developments or expansions of existing developments are able to offset by 
reducing off-site nonpoint emissions. A summary of operational offset schemes in the United 
States is provided in Table 2.   
While the mechanics of offset schemes appear relatively straight forward, their performance 
in practice has been fraught with difficulties. In general, the level of trading activity has failed to 
live up to the expectations of their proponents. In most instances few offset trades have been 
made and cost-savings have remained relatively small (Environomics 1999). This is exemplified 
by the performance of the Lake Dillon effluent trading scheme where the first offset trade took 
fifteen years to complete (see Box 1).  
A report prepared by Environomics (1999) for the US EPA advances a number of reasons 
for the relatively poor performance of offset schemes. These include: low interest in trading from 
point source polluters; difficulties in identifying a sufficient number of suitable nonpoint sources; 
high administrative costs; coordination difficulties due to the large number of heterogeneous 
participants; uncertainty regarding trading rules; reluctance to negotiate trades due to the cost 
involved; a break down in negotiations between key stakeholders in setting trading ratios; a lack 
Source: Environomics (1999). Note: POTW is a privately owned treatment works and WWTP is a wastewater         
treatment plant. 
Table 2 US tradable emissions permits offset schemes for water pollution 
Waterbody/location  Pollutant  Number of participants  Trade type/ratio 
Boulder Creek, Colorado  Ammonia, 
temperature, pH 
City of Boulder and various 
nonpoint sources 
Point/Nonpoint (na) 
Cherry Creek Basin, 
Colorado 
Phosphorus  12 WWTP’s and various 
nonpoint sources 
Point/Point and 
Point/Nonpoint (up to 
3:1) 
Lake Dillon, Colorado  Phosphorus  4 POTW, several WWTP’s 
and various nonpoint sources 
Point/Nonpoint (2:1) 
Kalamazoo River, Michigan  Phosphorus  Various nonpoint sources, 1 
POTW’s and non-Govt 
environmental groups 
Point/Nonpoint (2:1 and 
4:1) 
Tar-Pamlico, North Carolina  Nitrogen and 
phosphorus 
Large – point and nonpoint  Point/Point and 
Point/Nonpoint (2:1) 
Specialty Minerals, Inc. 
(Massachusetts) 
Temperature  Specialty Minerals, Inc. and 
one town 
Point/Nonpoint (2:1) 
Southern Minnesota Beet 
Coop. Trading Program 
(Minnesota) 
Phosphorus  Beet Coop. and multiple 
farmers 
Point/Nonpoint (2.6:1) 
Rahr Malting – Minnesota 
River 
Phosphorus/CBOD  Rahr Malting Plant and 
numerous nonpoint sources 
Point/Nonpoint (2:1) 
CBOD/Phosphorus (8:1)  
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of information for potential participants about the benefits of participating in a trading scheme; 
strict rules regarding eligibility to participate in the trading scheme; and difficulties in developing 
emissions proxies for nonpoint source polluters. 
Although far less widely used, offset schemes in Australia have also failed to deliver the 
expected level of economic and environmental gains. This is demonstrated by the performance of 
the ongoing Environmental Improvement Initiative (EII) offset scheme in Geographe Bay, 
Western Australia. Under the EII program the Busselton wastewater treatment plant has sought 
to fund reductions in nitrogen emissions on nearby farms rather than reduce their on-site 
emissions. Early estimates suggested that off-site emissions reductions could be made for $1 
million, less than a quarter of the $4.5 million required on-site for a similar reduction in 
emissions (Humphries et al 2002). However, despite the selective targeting of high emission 
industries, few offset projects have been undertaken and in the first two years of the project just 
$24 000 has been spent on offset projects. Minimal improvements in water quality have resulted 
(Humphries et al 2002).
14 The reasons for the poor performance of the EII are similar to those 
experienced in the United States. Perhaps most importantly, it is clear that nonpoint source 
polluters are reluctant to participate in the program as they face no regulatory requirement to do 
so (Humphries et al 2002). 
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Box 1 The Lake Dillon effluent trading program 
The Lake Dillon effluent trading program is the second oldest effluent trading program in the United States and 
the first involving nonpoint source polluters. In 1982, in response to concerns about water quality in Lake Dillon 
a cap was placed on the total amount of phosphorus from four point source municipal wastewater treatment 
plants that could enter the lake. In 1984 it was decided that these point sources could increase their phosphorus 
emissions into the lake as long as they paid for reductions in an equivalent amount of phosphorus emissions into 
Lake Dillon from nonpoint sources elsewhere in the lake’s drainage basin. The primary source of nonpoint 
source pollution came from privately owned septic tanks of sewage disposal units. It was estimated that 
switching a home over to the wastewater facility would reduce emissions by one pound.  Point sources were 
prohibited from trading any surplus pollution allowances and trades with nonpoint sources were based on a 
trading ration of 2:1 (two pounds of estimated phosphorus reduction from a nonpoint source allowed point 
sources to increase their emissions by one pound). 
       While estimates made prior to the introduction of the scheme forecast strong demand for emission credits, 
the first trade did not occur until 1999 - fifteen years after the commencement of the program. To this point in 
time the lack of trade has been primarily attributed to low demand for emission reduction credits from the 
wastewater treatment facilities that chose to upgrade their facilities rather than offset increased emissions. A 
number of secondary reasons have also been suggested for the lack of trade including non cost-minimising 
behavior from wastewater treatment plants and the significant restrictions that were placed on trading by the 
committee responsible for accrediting trades reduced interest in trading (Environomics 1999). 
       The impetus for trading in 1999 was the proposed development of a ski resort and village in the lake’s 
drainage basin at Copper Mountain. Once it was established that the development would  not be allowed to 
increase net phosphorus emissions into Lake Dillon, significant demand for phosphorus credits was ensured. It 
was agreed that the developers of the Ski resort (Intrawest) would pay for eighty homes to shift from the septic 
systems to the wastewater treatment plant (an eighty pound reduction in phosphorus emissions). The cost of 
$500 000 to the developers was considerably lower than all other alternatives. As well as providing for a cost-
effective solution to the ski resort the trade also has the potential to reduce net emissions into lake Dillon by 
forty pounds (as a result of the 2:1 ratio) 
 
                                                 
14 During this time more than $300 000 has been spent on the administration of the program ((Humphries et al 2002). 
15 Other reasons for the poor performance of the EII scheme to date include: the requirement that nonpoint sources 
share half of the costs of offset projects; lack of knowledge, time and interest by farmers; and suspicion of 
‘outsiders’ (Humphries et al 2002).   
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        The nature of the problems faced in both the United States and Australia highlight the 
difficulties that confront the policy maker in applying offset schemes and more advanced forms 
of nonpoint source emissions trading. Moreover, they suggest the need for more considered 
preparation, design and application of this instrument if it is to deliver anywhere near the 
potential cost savings it offers in practice.
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Other instruments 
One of the most innovative and successful approaches to the management of nonpoint source 
water pollution is the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program (GAFTLP) in the San 
Joaquin Valley of California. Under this scheme nonpoint source selenium emissions from farms 
in six agricultural districts are collected in main drains, which are then measured and treated as 
point sources. Monthly and yearly selenium load allocations (SLAs) 
17 are apportioned among 
the six districts. If the aggregate selenium emissions from the group of nonpoint source emitters 
in a district (as measured in the main drain) exceed the SLA then the district authority is required 
to pay a fee.
18 Conversely, if aggregate emissions are below the SLA then the district authority 
receives a rebate from the regional drainage entity (Environomics 1999). As fees and rebates are 
levied on the district authority it is up to them to provide incentives for individual farmers to 
control their nonpoint selenium loads (Woodward et al 2002). 
In addition to the fee and rebate system, each district may also trade their SLAs. 
19 If an 
irrigation district exceed their SLA they may purchase rights from another district to avoid 
paying the fee. Conversely an irrigation district with emissions below their SLA may sell part of 
their SLA to another district if they can receive a better price than that provided by the rebate  
(Woodward et al 2002). By converting a number of nonpoint sources into one entity this system 
closely resembles the traditional point source emission trading program.  
As of February 2000 nine trades had been undertaken in the GAFTLP and selenium 
emissions had been substantially reduced (Woodward et al 2002; Young and Karkoski 2000). 
Three major factors have contributed to the relative success of the scheme. First, emissions have 
been able to be accurately monitored at relatively low cost. Second, it appears that there are 
sufficient economic drivers for trade (the marginal costs of abatement differ between agricultural 
districts). Finally, transaction costs have been kept low due to the small number of participants in 
the market.  
These conditions are only likely to be found in a limited number of circumstances. There 
may be few instances where nonpoint sources can be converted into point sources in the manner 
adopted in the GAFTLP. Where a conversion is technically feasible such a system warrants 
detailed consideration. 
                                                 
16 A pilot offset scheme is currently being developed in the lower Hawkesbury-Nepean River in Sydney (the South 
Creek pilot). While the design of this scheme is still being undertaken it appears that many of the lessons from the 
United States experience have been taken on board. In particular, a lengthy public information and education 
program and the proposal to use offset funds (rather than have individual offset agreements) are likely to improve 
the economic and environmental effectiveness of the pilot (NSW EPA 2002).  
17 The SLA is determined by mutual agreement among affected parties. It is based on historical discharge for the 
first two years and then decreases by five per cent per year for the following three years (Young and Karkoski 2000). 
18 The fee is equivalent to around $3/acre and is unlikely to provide a strong economic incentive to reduce emissions 
(Young and Karkoski 2000). 
19 Trades in the Grassland Areas Farmers Tradable Loads Program are made ex post, based on selenium loads that 
were actually discharged (Woodward et al 2002).  
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4. Lessons from the real world approach to nonpoint source water pollution 
While the economic literature continues to focus on the theoretical merits of various ambient and 
input based economic instruments, policy makers have failed to warm to such an approach. 
Concerns regarding the political and administrative difficulties associated with applying such 
instruments have tended to over-shadow any potential efficiency gains they may offer. Indeed, on 
the whole the policy landscape for addressing nonpoint source water pollution has generally been 
characterised by a reluctance to adopt any forms of economic instruments at all. The clear 
preference in most cases has been to rely on suasive measures such as community education and 
information programs. 
On the surface, this outcome may be seen to have arisen for two main reasons. First, it is 
only in the last twenty years or so that the scope and magnitude of nonpoint source polluters to 
water pollution has been recognised. That is, it is a relatively new political issue and developing 
efficient solutions will take time. Second, the inherent characteristics of nonpoint source 
pollution do not lend themselves to easy solutions (either theoretically or in practice) and as such 
have often been placed in the ‘too hard’ basket (Dosi and Tomasi 1994). Digging a little deeper, 
however, suggests that underlying beliefs about the property rights to pollute, the associated 
interest group politics and the high transaction costs of designing and implementing efficient and 
environmentally effective economic instruments have also played a critical role in shaping the 
way in which policy makers and governments address the problem of nonpoint source water 
pollution. These two issues are discussed in greater detail below. 
Underlying beliefs about property rights and interest group politics 
Underlying beliefs about property rights have undoubtedly played a major role in shaping the 
way in which governments around the world have approached the problem of nonpoint source 
water pollution. Although emissions from large point source polluters such as sewage works and 
factories are regulated in most developed countries, there has been great reluctance to extend the 
polluter pays principle over to nonpoint source emitters.  
        While most governments would not admit that nonpoint sources have the right to pollute 
waterways with their emissions, the reluctance to regulate or tax the management actions of these 
polluters has inadvertently provided the perception that these rights do exist. Changing these 
perceptions is not an easy task, and it is made even more difficult by the magnitude of the 
required change in management practices by nonpoint source polluters. By their nature, nonpoint 
source polluters are often relatively small enterprises unable to make all of the changes that may 
be required of them to reduce their emissions. Not surprisingly, calls to do so raise strong 
objections from farm interest groups. Where the decline in water quality is not sufficient to 
become a significant political issue in its own right, the temptation for government to bow to 
pressures from these politically powerful groups may be overwhelming.  
       The power of interest group politics is not just confined to influencing which pollution 
control measures are adopted. In those instances where economic instruments based on the 
polluter pays principle are implemented, interest groups are often able to bring considerable 
pressure to bear on the policy makers responsible for instrument design (Oates and Portney 
2001).  This has been clearly demonstrated in the design of emission charges for point source 
water pollution throughout Europe.
20 In France for instance, calls from environmental groups for 
                                                 
20 The almost universal preference to ‘grandfather’ permits in tradable emission permit schemes is another example 
of how industry groups have influenced instrument design. This issue is discussed in Keohane et al (1997).  
16 
increases in emission charges during the 1980’s were rejected by President Mitterand’s Ministry 
of Finance on the grounds that industry should not be subjected to any further tax burden 
(Andersen 2001). Similarly, in other European nations, the implementation of emission charges 
(and environmental taxes more generally) has included a wide array of significant exemptions 
and tax relief for certain sectors – often to placate vocal industry lobby groups (Ekins and Speck 
1999). At its worst this impact has been so great that the charge levied on high emission sectors 
(the focus of such schemes) has actually ended up lower than the charge on less significant 
small-scale emitters or households  (Ekins 1999).
21   
         The influence of interest groups in the policy process provides one piece of the puzzle as to 
why suasive measures and subsidies are often chosen by governments for the management of 
water pollution over charge based economic instruments. It also presents a clear challenge to 
economists to try and take instruments based on the polluter pays principle and package them in 
such a way as to make them politically acceptable while still providing for economic efficiency 
and effectiveness gains. At first blush, it may appear that there isn’t a lot that could be done 
about this other than the approaches already adopted – lowering charges or providing 
concessions. There are two further practical options, however.   
 The first relates to the timing of the introduction of the instrument. It is no surprise that 
sudden calls for the imposition of charges and taxes on polluting industries or mandatory 
requirements for increased pollution abatement generate considerable opposition. Who would 
think otherwise? Alternatively, charges or management requirements could be phased in 
progressively over a number of years, with any future increases transparently presented in a clear 
schedule. This approach, while reducing the environmental effectiveness of the instrument (at 
least in the first few years) allows the polluting firms to plan their investments efficiently in 
relation to either an increasing charge or management requirement and their own potential 
abatement costs (Paras 1997).  
The second option relates specifically to charge based economic instruments, whether they 
be based on emissions, inputs or management actions. Recycling revenue raised from the charge 
back to the affected parties can foster increased support for these instruments (Paras 1997). 
Revenue could flow back to affected industries in the form of a subsidy for pollution abatement 
22 or to reward exceptional environmental performance. Moreover, it is technically possible, 
albeit extremely complex, for the emission charge to be revenue neutral if other Government 
taxes or charges are reduced by an amount equal to each affected parties total emissions charge 
(Ekins 1999). 
23 
So, it appears that there is more that could be done with the design of economic instruments 
based on the polluter pays principle to support their increased acceptance and use. In particular, it 
appears that there are some relatively unexplored options available for reducing industry 
opposition with regards to the impact of the charge on both their tax burden and competitiveness. 
But the potential for these options to bring about widespread change should not be overstated. 
Such instruments (particularly taxes) are likely to involve the transparent imposition of a cost on 
                                                 
21 The example, which Ekins provides, is the Swedish CO2 tax where industry and horticulture received reductions 
of up to 75 per cent from the base rate. 
22 This approach has been adopted in the Netherlands system of effluent charges. It is estimated that the revenue 
raised through Dutch effluent charge has been responsible for the majority of industrial investments in water 
pollution control in that country (Andersen 2001). 
23 This was successfully achieved with the Dutch small energy users tax (Ekins 1999).  
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potentially powerful members of society no matter how they are designed (putting the unlikely 
case of revenue neutral design aside).  
Transaction costs 
Transaction costs have also played a critical role in instrument choice and help to explain both 
the relatively low adoption of economic instruments in natural resource and environmental 
management and the deviation between their theoretical promise and practical performance.  
       Transaction costs include both policy transaction costs and market transaction costs 
(McCann and Easter 1998; Thompson 1996; Challen 2001; Falconer and Saunders 2002).
24 
Policy transaction costs are predominantly borne by the policy maker (i.e. the government) and 
include the costs associated with: research, information gathering and analysis; enactment of 
enabling legislation (including lobbying and public participation costs); design and 
implementation of the policy (including costs of regulatory delay); support and administration of 
the on-going program; contracting costs; monitoring/detection costs (of both the efficiency of the 
outcome and the level of compliance); and prosecution/inducement costs (McCann and Easter 
(1998; 2002).
 25  Market transaction costs include costs associated with search and information, 
bargaining and decision making and the enforcement of the negotiated trade (Stavins 1995). 
Market transaction costs are predominantly borne by the polluter, but as many economic 
instruments are essentially administrative tools they are also partially borne by the policy maker 
(Herath and Alfons 1999). 
The textbook neoclassical explanation of the pollution problem assumes that the range of 
costs outlined above are equal to zero. Yet it is obvious that these costs not only exist in the real 
world but in some cases can be considerable (Stavins 1995; Saleth and Dinar 1999). It should 
come as no surprise then that economic instruments based on the neoclassical model fail to 
achieve their theoretical promise once these costs are considered. Indeed, high policy and 
transaction costs have played a major role in the failure of many water pollution trading schemes 
in the United States to deliver expected cost-savings (Hahn and Hester 1989; Environomics 
1999).  
High policy transaction costs have also shaped nonpoint source water pollution policy 
design. Suasive measures, including information and education programs are easier to design, 
face less stakeholder opposition and do not require new legislation. Moreover, by not mandating 
any pollution abatement they do not require potentially expensive monitoring, enforcement or 
prosecution. In short, these measures have relatively low transaction costs. Cost-share programs 
are likely to have higher policy transaction costs, requiring more considered design and on-going 
administration. However, they are unlikely to face significant negotiation and legislative costs. 
Furthermore, being based on the voluntary adoption of improved management practices they do 
not require an overly onerous monitoring regime. Harder-edged economic instruments, such as 
emission taxes and emissions trading would be expected to face far higher transaction costs. To 
                                                 
24 The nomenclature of transaction costs has become complicated and confused since Ronald Coase first brought the 
concept to popular attention in his article ‘The Problem of Social Cost’ in 1960. 
24. In a narrow sense transaction 
costs are often viewed as being the actual costs of making a transaction in a market – for instance, the costs of 
bringing buyers and sellers together in a tradable emissions permits market. The broader definition of transaction 
costs, which includes policy transaction costs, has arisen out of the New Institutional Economics Paradigm, and 
through the work of Williamson (1985) and North (1990) in particular. 
25 McCann and Easter (1998) acknowledge that their framework builds upon the institutional cost framework 
developed by Thompson (1996).   
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operate successfully they demand far more certainty regarding the source and magnitude of 
emissions and their environmental impact. In turn, this requires greater research and information 
gathering. Enactment of legislation is likely to become more protracted due to the influence of 
farm lobby groups and underlying beliefs about property rights (particularly for instruments 
based on the polluter pays principle). 
26 Contracting, monitoring, detection and administration 
costs are also likely to be high, particularly where there are a large number of nonpoint source 
polluters.  
The significant differential in transaction costs between suasive measures and economic 
instruments has surely played some role in pushing the former to the forefront of nonpoint source 
policy. With limited funds and resources available, it is no surprise that governments may be 
unable (and sometimes unwilling) to bear the higher policy transaction costs associated with 
more sophisticated measures. This presents a considerable challenge to economists. As Stavins 
(1995) suggests: 
 ‘..with transaction costs as with other departures from frictionless markets, greater attention should be paid to 
the details of design of specific systems, in order to lessen the risk of overselling these policy ideas and in order to 
create systems that stand a chance of being implemented successfully’ p146. 
So what can be done to reduce transaction costs? McCann and Easter (1998) suggest the 
policy measures aimed at addressing nonpoint source pollution are affected by a number of 
factors, including: the number and diversity of agents affected by the policy; resistance to the 
policy; the desired amount of pollution control; the time frame involved; whether the policy was 
voluntary or not; uncertainty; the available technology for best management practices; 
monitoring requirements; and the existing institutional arrangements. 
27 Many of these factors 
relate to the way in which a policy is designed and implemented. This suggests that economists 
and policy makers can influence the level of transaction costs.   
The first point where policy makers could encourage a reduction in transaction costs relates 
to the level of pollution control sought. The ideal of achieving zero or ‘socially optimal’ levels of 
nonpoint source pollution control is unrealistic in the current technological and political 
environment and small incremental gains or even maintenance of the status quo may have to be 
accepted as the policy objective.  
Reducing uncertainty and resistance to the introduction of economic instruments also 
appears to be of great importance. Adopting policies which place little or no financial burden on 
current nonpoint source polluters (such as subsidies) is one way in which these costs could be 
reduced. Where taxes are preferred, a number of steps may be taken. As discussed above, 
regulatory requirements could be phased in rather than imposed in a single hit. Tax rates could be 
gradually increased to the desired level. Finally, revenue raised from the imposition of the tax 
could be recycled back to the affected industry. Transaction costs generated due to uncertainty 
could be reduced through a strong public education and information program prior to the 
                                                 
26 Woerdman (2001) suggests that policy transaction costs are likely to increase the more that the distribution of 
property rights deviates from the status quo as rent seeking activities from lobby groups increased.  
27 Prior to McCann and Easter (1998) a number of analysts had outlined factors influencing transaction costs. These 
factors included: the degree of pollution control being sort by the policy maker (Stavins 1995); the type of policy 
being considered (Coase 1960); the number and diversity of agents (Williamson 1985, Oates 1986); available 
technology (North 1990); and the institutional environment (Coase 1960, North 1990).  
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implementation of the instrument 
28 and the adoption of a transparent and unambiguous 
approach, backed by legislation where appropriate.  
Market transaction costs may be reduced through the use of a brokerage service to supply 
information about potential buyers and sellers and help them identify one another (Stavins 1995). 
Governments can also reduce market transaction costs by reducing regulatory barriers, such as 
lengthy pre-approval for trades. 
Making the required changes to reduce policy and market transaction costs will not always 
come easily. More often than not they involve making important trade-offs with the economic 
efficiency and environmental effectiveness of the economic instrument. Moreover, they may 
reduce one component of transaction costs while increasing another (e.g. phasing in projects 
reduces resistance but may increase administration costs). These trade-offs have to be carefully 
considered. Situations where transaction costs exceed the economic efficiency gains provided by 
economic instruments should be avoided. Similarly, the environmental performance of the 
instrument should not be sacrificed simply to generate greater reductions in transaction costs.  
Conclusion 
While the challenges for the successful design and implementation of economic instruments to 
address nonpoint source water pollution are considerable, the demand for economic solutions to 
this and other environmental problems appear to be increasing.
29 This growth is largely in 
response to two factors. First, alternative policy approaches have often failed to bring about the 
desired reductions in nonpoint source pollution. Concerns about the future environmental 
impacts of maintaining this path have grown. Second, the pressure on governments to deliver 
more cost-effective environmental management has increased as environment budgets have 
failed to keep pace with the required level of environmental management.  
The ball is now firmly in the economists’ and policy makers’ court and the challenges are 
clearly presented. The question remains - can economic instruments be designed so that they are 
politically acceptable, reduce unnecessary transaction costs, provide for efficiency gains in the 
allocation of resources and provide incentives for improved environmental performance? These 
questions are considered in the following section in the context of a practical case study of the 
Swan-Canning River system in Perth, Western Australia. 
5. Case study: Nonpoint water pollution in the Swan-Canning River system 
The Swan-Canning river system consists of the rivers, watercourses, drains and tidally affected 
estuaries on the coastal plain around metropolitan Perth. It covers an area of more than 2000 
square kilometers and is made up of thirty-one catchments spread over urban, industrial, semi-
rural and rural land uses (SRT 1999). 
The system is of great economic, recreational and environmental importance for the people 
of Western Australia, and has been since the establishment of the Swan River colony in 1829 
(SRT 1999). Over the last one hundred years a combination of broad scale clearing for 
agriculture and rapid urbanisation and industrialisation has placed the system under significant 
environmental pressure. Public and government attention was drawn to this issue in 1994 as a 
                                                 
28 The costs of the public education and information program would also have to be considered in ex-ante analysis of 
the instrument, however. 
29 This may be evidenced by the $10 million portion of the 2001 National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality 
earmarked for pilots of various economic instruments around Australia. Further evidence is provided by the growing 
numbers of economists in Environmental and Natural Resource Government Departments and organisations.  
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severe toxic blue-green algal bloom forced the closure of the river to recreational use for several 
months (SRT 1999). Since that event the incidence and severity of algal blooms in the Swan-
Canning River system has increased dramatically (SRT 2002a).
30 In February 2000, a massive 
toxic blue-green algal bloom resulted in concentrations of algal cells in the system reaching as 
much as 6500 times the limit considered safe for recreational use as nitrogen and phosphorus 
levels in the Swan-Canning river system exceeded acceptable limits by 700 per cent and 300 per 
cent respectively (SRT 2000b). 
In response to mounting community concern regarding the impacts of these algal blooms 
and fears that their incidence and severity would continue to increase in the future, the Western 
Australian Government launched the Swan-Canning Cleanup Program (SCCP). The initial stages 
of the SCCP focused on collecting scientific data on the condition of the river and determining 
the likely causes of the algal blooms. A number of key findings, with great importance for the 
management of the environmental health of the system, resulted. These findings are briefly 
outlined below. 
First, the Swan-Canning River system is naturally predisposed to algal blooms. The open, 
sunny, slow-moving and shallow conditions of the Swan River combined with sandy soils with 
poor nutrient binding properties are ideal for algal growth.  
Second, algal blooms are being fuelled by high concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus 
entering the river system from the Swan-Canning catchment (SRT 1999). While nutrients from 
large point sources have been effectively managed, nutrients continue to enter the system from a 
large range of urban and rural nonpoint sources, small to medium size industrial and commercial 
properties and intensive agricultural enterprises such as piggeries, poultry farms and market 
gardens (SRT 1999).
 31 Nonpoint sources are believed to provide the majority of nutrients 
delivered to the Swan-Canning river system (SRT 2000c). 
Third, the level of nitrogen and phosphorus entering the system varies considerably from one 
catchment to the next, suggesting the need for a targeted management approach (see Table 3). 
Two catchments in particular, Ellen Brook and the Southern River, have a particularly strong 
influence on the estuarine ecology of the Swan-Canning River system. Located in the rural fringe 
around the Perth metropolitan area, the Ellen Brook and Southern River catchments supply the 
second and third largest volume of water to the Swan-Canning estuarine system, respectively. 
Both have moderate to very high nutrient concentrations.
32 Nonpoint agricultural sources are 
believed to account for the majority of nutrients entering the river system from both the Ellen 
Brook and Southern River catchments (SRT 2000c). A number of urban catchments, including 
those of the Mills Street Main Drain, Bannister Creek and Bayswater Main Drain are also 
responsible for lesser, but nonetheless significant export of nutrients into the Swan-Canning 
system. These nutrients come from a number of nonpoint sources, including urban parks and 
gardens, golf courses, unsewered residential areas as well as from small commercial and  
                                                 
30 Between 1994 and 2002 twenty-nine separate blooms have been recorded in the Canning River system alone (SRT 
2002a).  
31 Government policy from the 1930’s onwards encouraged the relocation of heavy industry and sewage treatment 
plants and by 1980 large point sources of nutrients had been mostly eliminated (SRT 1999). 
32 The Ellen Brook catchment alone accounts for around one third of the total phosphorus load entering the Swan-
Canning system (Agriculture Western Australia 2001).  
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Table 3 Nutrient emissions from catchments in the Swan-Canning River system 









Ellen Brook  Rural – broad acre grazing, animal agistment, horticulture 
and viticulture 







Southern River  Semi rural – broad acre agriculture, horticulture and 
intensive livestock agistments 









Urban – medium density residential 
Light industry 
High  High  Low 
Bannister 
Creek 
Urban – medium density residential 
Industry – light to heavy  Moderate  Moderate  Low 
Bayswater 
Main Drain 
Urban – high density residential 
Light to medium industry  Moderate  Low  Moderate 
Bickley Brook  Urban – medium density residential 
Semi-rural – broad acre agriculture and horticulture 









Urban – medium density residential 
Light industry  Moderate  Low  Low 
Helena River  Urban – medium density residential 










Urban – high density residential 
Industry – light to medium  Low  Moderate  Low 
Avon River  Rural - broad acre grazing, animal agistment, cereal crops 
Urban – townships are common  Low  Low  Very High 
Bennett Brook  Urban – low density residential 
Rural – livestock agistment, viticulture and horticulture  Low  Low  Moderate 
Jane Brook  Remnant vegetation – large tracts of native forest 
Semi-rural – broad acre grazing, viticulture and horticulture 









Rural – broad acre agriculture, viticulture and grazing 
Remnant Vegetation – forested areas upstream 







Canning River  Urban – medium density residential 
Remnant Vegetation – forested areas upstream 







Yule Brook  Rural – horticulture, intensive animal agistment 
Urban – rapidly developing residential areas 







                 Source: SRT (2000c); SRT (2002).  
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industrial point sources that continue to discharge their wastewater directly into the drainage 
system (SRT 2000c).
33 
Fourth, because of lags in transport time through the catchment, linking nutrient 
concentrations to a change in catchment condition is difficult and uncertain, particularly for 
nonpoint sources of nutrients (SRT 2000d). Trends in nutrient concentrations from nonpoint 
sources of nutrients in catchments are likely to be characterised by a steady slow change in 
nutrient levels over long periods (SRT 2000d).  
Fifth, a large amount of phosphorus enters the Swan-River system as surface runoff during 
storm events (Jakowyna 2002). The export of nutrients in this fashion has been exacerbated by 
the degradation of riparian zones and extensive land clearing (SRT 2000c).
34 Around one sixth of 
nutrients are also estimated to enter the system via movement from the shallow groundwater 
table that lies beneath Perth (SRT 1999). 
Finally, nonpoint source nitrogen and phosphorus emissions from Perth’s rapidly increasing 
urban residential development 
35 pose a significant long term threat to the Swan-Canning river 
system. New urban development would be expected to increase the level of nitrogen and 
phosphorus emissions into the Swan-Canning river system as: nutrient runoff from urban areas 
increases in proportion to the area of impervious surfaces such as roads and roofs (SRT 1999); 
the clearing of remnant vegetation for urban development makes land more susceptible to erosion 
and provides direct paths for nutrients into waterways 
36; fertiliser application rates increase as 
housing density increases (SRT 1999); and as the number of vehicles and domestic animals in a 
given area increase (SRT1999). In the case of Perth, the environmental impact of urban 
development is further exacerbated as it is expected to be forced into areas which are both 
difficult to drain and likely to have the greatest potential impact on water quality in the Swan-
Canning river system (Robinson 2001). 
In response to their increased knowledge regarding current and potential sources of nitrogen 
and phosphorus into the Swan-Canning river system, the Western Australian Government 
released the Swan-Canning Cleanup Program Action Plan in 1999 (the Action Plan). The 10 
recommendations made in the Action Plan may be summarised into four key Actions: 1) support 
Integrated Catchment Management to reduce nutrient inputs; 2) improve planning and land use 
management to reduce nutrient inputs; 3) modify river conditions to reduce algal blooms; and 4) 
monitor river health, fill critical gaps in knowledge and report progress to the community. 
Of greatest interest for the purposes of this paper is the second of the key actions. More 
specifically Action 2 outlines the need to modify land-use practices and prevent or relocate 
polluting activities, develop and adopt best management practices to reduce nutrient inputs in 
current land management practices and in all future developments, and use economic and 
                                                 
33 These include former landfills, industrial sites and stockyards. 
34 Satellite imagery indicates that in some portions of the Swan-Canning river system, such as the western margin of 
the Darling Plateau in the Ellen Brook catchment, nearly all remnant vegetation has been cleared (Agriculture 
Western Australia 2001). 
35 Perth is one of the fastest growing cities in Australia. Its population is expected to increase from its current level 
of around 1.4 million to between 1.8 and 2.3 million people by 2031 (Western Australian Planning Commission 
2000). 
36 It has been estimated that around 6000 hectares of remnant vegetation was cleared in the Perth metropolitan area 
over a two year period in the mid 1990’s, with a high proportion of this being for approved urban development (SRT 
1999).  
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regulatory mechanisms to encourage catchment, wetland and river foreshore management (SRT 
1999). 
To date the major actions taken to address water quality in the Swan-Canning river system 
as part of the Action Plan have centred on a combination of on-ground works by community and 
catchment groups 
37, public education, ongoing research and monitoring and a number of 
scientific and engineering projects 
38 (2002b). These actions reflect the way in which the Western 
Australian Government treats responsibility for addressing nonpoint source water pollution. The 
Action Plan states that it is ‘impractical and unreasonable’ (SRT 1999 p89) for costs of 
environmental improvements to be borne by nonpoint sources that contribute to nutrients in the 
Swan-Canning river system. Rather, the Action Plan states that the costs of implementing actions 
to reduce nutrient emissions should ‘…. be considered a general community cost and be funded, 
principally, from State Government revenue and revenue of relevant local governments on a 
basis to be determined by consultation between the parties’ (SRT 1999 p89). 
The prevailing attitude to who should pay for the costs of reducing emissions may partly 
explain why very little attention has yet to be paid to the potential role that economic instruments 
could play alongside the current suite of activities adopted through the Action Plan, particularly 
for addressing nonpoint source pollution. Moreover, while the strong political will for improved 
water quality in the Swan-Canning river system may be evinced by the substantial effort 
currently being made through the various activities of the Swan Canning Cleanup Program, the 
focus of the program remains centred around measures based on the beneficiary (i.e. the 
community) pays principle. At no point in the Swan Action Plan is there any indication that 
nonpoint sources are likely to be regulated or licensed, with most effort being aimed at education 
and information provision and cost-sharing assistance for voluntary on-ground works (SRT 1999; 
SRT 2000a; SRT 2001; SRT 2002b). Furthermore, there is no evidence that these views will 
change in the near future and economic instruments must be designed with this consideration 
firmly in mind.  
6. Potential economic instruments for nonpoint water pollution control in the 
Swan-Canning river system 
After consideration of the political, regulatory, institutional, environmental and economic 
landscape of the Swan-Canning river system it appears that there may be a significant role for 
economic instruments, alongside regulatory and suasive measures, as part of the ongoing 
management of water quality. An initial evaluation of the merits of four such instruments is 
provided in this section.  
       The first two of these instruments are designed to provide greater incentives for the adoption 
of best management practices (BMP) by agricultural nonpoint source polluters. The first, a 
system of auctioned grants for the voluntary improvement of management practices is based on 
the current underlying beliefs regarding the property rights for nonpoint source emissions. The 
second, a system of BMP incentive charges, is based on the principle that the nonpoint source 
polluters should pay for their emissions. While it is clear that such an approach sits uneasily in 
the current political environment, the design of this instrument is aimed at mimimising this 
                                                 
37 In 2001-02, $415 000 was provided to eight catchment groups, with the Ellen Brook catchment group being the 
largest recipient (2002b) 
38 These include the building of an artificial wetland, drain retrofitting, oxygenation of the river and the Phoslock 
modified clay treatment trial.  
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opposition from nonpoint source polluters and their lobby groups through a system of gradual 
phasing in of BMP requirements and charges for non-compliance as well as a system of revenue 
recycling to reward positive environmental action.  
       The third economic instrument to be examined is a system of emissions offsets targeted at 
managing future increases in urban residential nonpoint emissions. In recognition of the potential 
for high transaction costs to erode the benefits from such a scheme, a regionally managed offset 
bank system is considered.   
A fourth instrument, similar to that introduced in the San Joaquin Valley in California (as 
outlined above) is also examined. While not being suitable as a short term solution (due to the 
current regulatory and institutional arrangements) this instrument is considered due to its ability 
to address both urban and agricultural nonpoint source pollution at some point in the future. 
As will become apparent, the relative strengths and weaknesses of each instrument vary 
considerably. Furthermore, it is important to recognise that instrument design and the choice of 
where the instrument is applied are critical determinants of the likely economic and 
environmental performance of each of these instruments. This point should not be understated – 
economic instruments have performed well in those instances where concerns regarding 
administrative complexities, distributive impacts and stakeholder acceptability have been 
explicitly addressed upfront. In cases where factors such as monitoring and enforcement costs, 
stakeholder opposition and inappropriate economic conditions have been ignored, economic 
instruments for pollution control have generally performed very poorly. With these 
considerations in mind each of these instruments is discussed below.  
Auctioned BMP payments 
The development and implementation of BMPs is regarded as one of the key ways in which 
nutrient emissions from nonpoint sources can be reduced.  BMPs complement industry standards 
and objectives, taking account of the state of technology, local physical and environmental 
conditions and the financial implications for the party undertaking management change (SRT 
1999).  
The process of developing BMPs is a statutory requirement in the Swan-Canning 
Environmental Protection Policy. As part of this process, management guidelines for a number of 
industries responsible for nonpoint source pollution have been developed. For instance, a range 
of broad recommended management practices for the grazing industry in the Ellen Brook are 
provided in the Agriculture Western Australia publication Sustainable Land Management in the 
Ellen Brook Catchment (Agriculture Western Australia 2001). As the Ellen Brook is a major 
contributor of both phosphorus and nitrogen into the Swan-Canning River system this example is 
used to explain how a system of BMP payments might operate. 
The grazing of beef and horses on legume based pastures are the most common land uses in 
the Ellen Brook catchment and are a significant source of phosphorus emissions into the Swan-
Canning River system (Agriculture Western Australia 2001). Emissions of nitrogen and 
phosphorus from the grazing industry are derived from commercial fertilisers applied to pastures 
in rates that exceed plant requirements and effluent from animal faeces in grazing areas 
(Agriculture Western Australia 2001). Subsequently, the control of water erosion and nutrient 
and fertiliser application are seen as the two key elements of managing the export of nutrients in 
this catchment. Within these two elements there are a complex range of specific management 
actions that could be considered as BMPs.   
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Management measures to reduce the risk of erosion by water include: construction of grade 
banks; fencing off creeks and waterways; re-establishing vegetation (such as sedge and rush 
beds) along the edges of creeks and waterways; maintaining grassed waterways in paddocks; 
cultivating on the contour of the land; and increasing the infiltration of water by maintaining 
healthy and well structured soils (Agriculture Western Australia 2001).  
Nutrient and fertiliser management measures include: the use of soil testing to determine the 
nutrient requirements of the pasture; 
39 carefully timed fertiliser application to enhance plant 
uptake and avoid leaching of nutrients; 
40 the use of slow release fertilisers (where possible); the 
establishment of setbacks beyond or within which no fertiliser is applied; vegetated buffer areas 
which break up and reduce the severity of runoff sheet flows; and the fencing of creeks and 
waterways to reduce the level of stock faeces directly entering the waterway (SRT 1999; 
Agriculture Western Australia 2001).  
Strategic replanting along fence lines and streamlines, windbreaks and revegetated 
foreshores and floodplains are also considered to be important for reducing the level of nutrients 
entering waterways and improving water quality more generally (SRT 1999). Re-vegetation of 
the riparian strip provides a number of benefits including erosion control, filtration of nutrients, 
habitat for wildlife as well as aesthetic and recreational benefits for humans. 
Together, these actions represent a ‘toolbox’ of BMPs that may be employed to reduce 
emissions. Which particular practice is most effective will vary considerably from one site to the 
next (SRT 1999). That is, there is no single BMP or group of BMPs that may be considered as 
the most suitable management alternative for all farms in the Ellen Brook catchment. BMP on 
one farm may involve soil testing and the construction of grade banks while for others the most 
important management action may be the fencing off of waterways. In the Ellen Brook 
catchment, a wide variety of landforms, soil types and microclimates require different land 
management styles and practices to manage the impact of the agricultural activity on water 
quality (Agriculture Western Australia 2001). The heterogeneous nature of nonpoint source 
polluters and the impacts that various land management activities have on the level of emissions 
from one site to the next are important considerations in choosing and designing the appropriate 
policy response.  
The current approach for encouraging the adoption of these management practices in Ellen 
Brook is based on a public information campaign (including farm planning days). Funding for 
undertaking some of the activities suggested above is available through Commonwealth 
programs such as Landcare. A dedicated program aimed at providing grants to encourage the 
uptake of BMPs in the Ellen Brook catchment (and in the Swan-Canning River system more 
generally) does not currently exist. The possible design of such a scheme is discussed below.   
In their most simple form BMP payments are no more than a fixed-rate payment from the 
government to a landholder for the landholder to undertake an agreed management action. For 
instance, a farmer may receive $x for each metre of fencing they place around a waterway. 
Adopting this form of grant delivery is most efficient where the potential improvement in water 
                                                 
39 Soil tests in the Ellen Brook area have suggested that too much phosphorus is being applied to pastures 
(Agriculture Western Australia 2001). 
40 Agriculture Western Australia suggest the best approach to involve a split application of phosphorus, potassium 
and sulphur being top dressed three to four weeks after germination, followed by a later application of mainly 
potassium and sulphur in August. Decisions on the appropriate timing and amounts will depend on soil types and 
soil testing should be carried out prior to application (Agriculture Western Australia 2001).  
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quality and the opportunity cost of delivering these improvements are homogenous (Falconer and 
Saunders 2002). These conditions rarely apply in practice, however, and as discussed above 
Ellen Brook is no exception.  
Where sites are heterogeneous, targeted grant delivery is likely to deliver a more cost-
effective outcome (Falconer and Saunders 2002). Such a system takes into account the 
differences between farm types and differentiates payments according to the opportunity cost of 
undertaking a management action and the expected improvements in water quality that it will 
provide. Targeting grant delivery comes at a cost, however. This occurs due to the clear presence 
of information asymmetry (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoot 1997). Nonpoint source 
polluters (in this case farmers in the Ellen Brook catchment) have a far better idea than the 
government as to how various management changes will affect their production plans and profits. 
Under these conditions the government needs to expend resources to have landholders reveal 
information about these impacts.  
Auctions (or competitive tendering) are one mechanism that can elicit the required 
information from farmers. In addition, auctions may be designed to accommodate variability in 
water quality improvements from one site to the next (Latacz-Lohmann and Van der Hamsvoot 
(1997). Competition between bidders for BMP payments and the ability of the government to 
compare the environmental and cost-effectiveness of each bid also provides for a more cost-
effective solution.  
For these reasons, competitive tendering has been used in a number of environmental 
programs around the world. The Conservation Reserve Program (CRP) in the United States is the 
largest and best known of these. 
41 More recently, this approach has been used as part of the 
BushTender trial in Victoria to deliver payments to farmers for management actions that increase 
the biodiversity value of their land. Results from early trials of BushTender indicated that cost 
savings of around $2.3 million (or eighty-five per cent) were achieved by using a competitive 
tendering system rather than a fixed-rate approach (Stoneham et al 2002). 
Despite the obvious advantages of using such an approach, the use of competitive tendering 
in addressing nonpoint source water pollution has been limited. Many of the issues faced in the 
provision of BMP payments to address nonpoint source water pollution mirror those faced in 
biodiversity conservation, however, and it appears that a similar scheme to that adopted in the 
BushTender trial could be used to improve water quality in the Ellen Brook catchment.  
The first step in developing such a scheme involves linking the impact that various 
management practices would be expected to have on emissions of nitrogen and phosphorus. This 
is necessary so that the relative improvements in water quality from actions undertaken from one 
site to the next can be compared. In the case of Ellen Brook it appears that these links are 
uncertain and cannot be made with a great degree of confidence. This uncertainty is exemplified 
by the findings of a detailed study undertaken in Ellen Brook to examine the role of constructed 
wetlands in reducing nutrient emissions from farms. Despite intensive research this study was 
unable to provide any quantitative guidance on what emissions benefits would result (Agriculture 
Western Australia 2000). While the difficulties in establishing the links between management 
actions and water quality should not be understated, for the purposes of examining how a system 
of auctioned BMP payments could operate it is assumed that these links are known.  
                                                 
41 Land retirement contracts under the CRP have been delivered through a competitive bidding mechanism since 
1986.  
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 The next stage of a system of auctioned BMP payments would involve an assessment of 
individual sites within the Ellen Brook catchment to determine which management actions would 
be most suited to each site and what the likely impact on water quality of undertaking these 
actions would be. Based on the model adopted for BushTender, landholders would then identify 
the actions they would be prepared to undertake and prepare an agreed management plan as the 
basis of their bid (Stoneham et al 2002).  
Following the preparation of the management plan, landholders would be asked to submit a 
sealed tender for the level of payment they require from the government if they are to undertake 
the proposed management action.  It is envisaged that cost-sharing provisions could also be 
included in the scheme whereby individuals may propose to undertake some of the costs of 
changing their management practices. This would not only alleviate the public cost of 
undertaking the management change but would also improve the competitiveness of their bid. 
Furthermore, tenders could also be made collaboratively with neighboring properties for actions 
that may cross farm boundaries. For instance it may make sense for a contour bank to run into a 
neighbor’s dam, while stabilisation of creek lines is easier and more cost-effective when large 
lengths are done at the same time (Agriculture Western Australia 2001). 
Once all tenders have been received, the government would then access each tender in terms 
of its cost and the anticipated impact on pollution levels.  Funds would be provided for those 
activities that are considered to provide the greatest per dollar improvement in water quality.  
Successful landholders would then be notified and required to sign legally enforceable 
management agreements outlining what is expected from the landholder and how much they will 
receive if they undertake these actions. The BMP payments could be either provided upfront 
(placing the risk of non-compliance with the government) or paid once the management action 
has been completed (placing the risk of non-payment with the landholder). To share the risks the 
payments could be spread over the life of the project. 
 The benefits of auctioned BMP payment over fixed-rate payments are clear. As evidenced 
by the results of the BushTender trial in Victoria significant cost-savings and economic 
efficiency gains may be made by opening up competition between farmers for payments and 
incorporating cost-minimisation as the basis for ranking tenders, (Stoneham et al 2002). These 
gains enable either more to be achieved with a limited budget or the freeing up of government 
resources for other programs.  
It is important to recognise that these cost-savings do not take into account the total 
transaction costs associated with the design, delivery and upkeep of the approach, however. The 
full cost of a system of BMP payments includes not only the costs of the payments to landholders 
but also the administrative and organisational costs incurred by both parties. These would include 
the cost of acquiring the necessary level of information to rank tenders, negotiating contracts 
with landholders and monitoring and enforcing management agreements. Whether or not a 
system of BMP payments would be more cost-effective than fixed-rate payments once 
transaction costs are taken into account is uncertain.  Moreover, the reduction in emissions of 
phosphorus and nitrogen from properties in the Ellen Brook catchment generated by a system of 
auctioned BMP payments is also unclear due to the voluntary nature of the program. Both of 
these issues demand further and careful consideration. 
BMP incentive charges 
While auctioned BMP payments are based on the current underlying beliefs regarding the 
property rights for nonpoint source emissions, a system of BMP incentive charges is based on the  
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polluter pays principle. In this sense, auctioned BMP payments may be viewed as a form of 
subsidy and BMP incentive charges as a tax.  
 As discussed earlier, although it is not currently possible to use a system of emission 
charges for nonpoint source polluters, taxes may be based on observable input use and 
management actions. Where one input is the major contributor to the pollution problem a single 
input tax may be considered.
42 However, in the case of Ellen Brook it is clear that there are a 
combination of inputs and management actions that are important determinants of the level of 
emissions from farms in the Ellen Brook catchment. This suggests that a more integrated 
approach, that takes account all of these actions is required. BMP incentive charges are one such 
approach. 
Under a system of BMP incentive charges, nonpoint source polluters face variable charges 
based on their management practices. Actions that result in high levels of emissions face the 
highest charges while farms demonstrating BMPs would be exempt. Assuming that incremental 
improvements in management practices may be made, a series of charge levels could be placed 
between these two extremes. Ideally the level of charges would be closely related to the level of 
environmental damage caused by various management actions. This would improve the 
economic efficiency of the instrument and enable the internalisation of externalities associated 
with excessive emissions. If the level of environmental damage caused by emissions, and hence 
the charge faced by the nonpoint source polluter, was high enough, an incentive to implement 
BMPs to avoid paying the charge may exist. In this way the system of BMP incentive charges 
would encourage the uptake of BMPs, reduce nitrogen and phosphorus emissions and improve 
water quality.  
Unfortunately, the level of science needed to link potentially costly management actions 
with emissions and environmental damage is not currently available. As discussed earlier, any 
attempt to base charges on environmental damage under conditions of scientific uncertainty is 
likely to generate significant opposition from affected stakeholders. Moreover, the legal validity 
of adopting such an approach is questionable.  
Whilst significantly reducing the appeal of BMP incentive charges, this does not necessarily 
spell their demise. Indeed, many practical applications of emission charges for point source 
pollution (particularly in Europe) have faced similar problems, with charges not being linked to 
environmental damage and the level of incentive for pollution abatement remaining too low to 
facilitate pollution abatement (OECD 1997; Andersen 2001; Stavins 2001). Despite this, some of 
these schemes are still considered to have been relatively successful and have resulted in 
improved water quality (Andersen 2001). These improvements have arisen as the revenue raised 
from emission charges has either been recycled back to polluters so that they undertake pollution 
abatement or has been used for public environmental programs.  
The European experience with point source emission charges suggests that even without the 
required scientific and economic information a system of BMP incentive charges could reduce 
emissions from nonpoint source polluters in catchments such as Ellen Brook. The first stage in 
establishing these charges would be to determine what management actions are going to be 
required under the system. Using BMPs as an end point, a schedule of what may constitute a 
                                                 
42 A fertiliser tax may warrant further consideration for catchments such as Ellen Brook. Two factors work against 
this instrument, however. First, fertiliser tends to be highly inelastic meaning that a large tax would be needed to 
induce management changes and reduce emissions (Ecotec 2001). Second, introducing a large tax on fertiliser is 
generally politically unpalatable and is unlikely to be seriously considered (Vatn et al 2002).    
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reasonable time-path from current to best management practices could be prepared. This could be 
done by a regional or catchment authority or by the State Government in consultation with 
farmer and environmental groups.  
The chosen path from current to best management practices may end up involving several 
broad progressive management changes.
43 For instance, the first step may be that all farms 
undertake soil testing. An interim step may involve the provision of fertiliser setback areas, while 
a final step could entail the revegetation and fencing of all waterways. 
Once these steps have been agreed to a series of charges may be attached. For instance, the 
charge for farms who have undertaken none of these steps could be $x/year. Farms who have 
undertaken step one may pay a lower charge equal to $y/year. Charges would get progressively 
lower as more of the BMP steps were completed until farms that are deemed to be undertaking 
BMPs would pay no charge at all.
44  
The imposition of these charges would be expected to face significant opposition from farms 
and farm groups within Ellen Brook. Lengthy negotiations between these groups and the 
government have the potential to rapidly increase policy transaction costs. As alluded to earlier, 
there are a number of options available to reduce both the opposition from farm groups and the 
resultant transaction costs.  
Firstly, the introduction of charges can be phased in gradually in recognition of the potential 
magnitude of management changes that may be required. It is clear that some of the 
recommended management changes will be relatively costly and require significant resources 
from the landholder. It would be clearly unreasonable for the government to expect farms to 
undertake these actions at short notice. Once the schedule of required management actions and 
charges was determined farmers may be given a period to adjust to the new system. For instance, 
it may be decided that farms have five years to adjust before the charges were to be introduced. 
In this period they can determine the impact that the charges will have on their operation and 
make management changes so as to reduce the charge they will receive once the program comes 
into operation.  
Opposition could also be reduced by gradually increasing charges over a period of time. For 
instance, a charge schedule for each of the BMP steps over a period of ten years from the 
commencement of the program could be presented to farmers. Charges in year one of the 
program (five years after its initial announcement) could start low and gradually increase to the 
desired level by year ten (fifteen years after the commencement of the program). Fees could also 
be capped at a maximum amount so as not to endanger financial viability in the short term. While 
these may appear to be extreme concessions, they may be required to engender the necessary 
stakeholder support for the introduction of the charge system. Where there is the serious 
overhanging threat of direct regulation (i.e. a mandatory requirement to adopt BMPs) 
concessions may be watered down, as stakeholder support for the charge system would be more 
forthcoming.  
Finally, once administrative costs have been covered, revenue raised through the collection 
of charges could be recycled back to affected industries to reward those farms that have made the 
                                                 
43 Broad management changes that would be likely to reduce emissions from all farms should be chosen. Whether or 
not this is possible when farms are heterogeneous is uncertain. 
44 Any BMPs, which were found to be not as effective as initially intended, could be removed from the schedule. It 
is important that farmers who have undertaken these actions in the current round of BMP incentive charges are not 
penalised.    
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greatest management changes. These farms could have their charges returned and also receive 
additional payments to offset the costs of the actions they have undertaken. Revenue could also 
be used to provide rebates to farms that can demonstrate exceptional financial circumstances.   
Alternatively, part of the revenue could be recycled back to the affected industry (to reduce 
opposition) and part could be used to fund public environmental works in the Ellen Brook 
catchment. Public works in the Ellen Brook could include large engineering works, such as the 
construction of wetlands, as well as the foreshore management of public waterways (SRT 1999).  
Although the actual environmental effectiveness of a system of BMP incentive charges 
would depend heavily on the way it was designed, such an approach holds considerable appeal. It 
provides greater flexibility to farmers than a regulatory requirement to implement BMPs while 
providing for greater incentives to do so than a voluntary requirement. Moreover, the funds 
raised through the charge can be used to fund greater improvements in water quality. 
Furthermore, the measurement and compliance costs associated with this system are likely to be 
significantly lower than more complex instruments (especially market based instruments).  
Such a scheme cannot guarantee significant environmental improvements, however. It is 
clear from the discussion above that the level of economic and environmental efficiency offered 
by BMP incentive charges is dependant on the level of incentive charges and the way in which 
revenue is recycled. Setting charges so that they are both politically acceptable (in terms of 
current beliefs about property rights) and high enough to provide an incentive for management 
change is difficult. Allowing concessions, such as lower charges and phase-in provisions, while 
reducing opposition to the imposition of a system of BMP incentive charges, may also reduce the 
environmental effectiveness of the program. If charges are set too low, no incentive for improved 
environmental performance by farmers may result. In this case, the only improvements in water 
quality will be generated through the recycling of revenue for pollution abatement or public 
works. Alternatively, too higher charges or too fewer concessions may mean that the program 
generates such opposition that it never sees the light of day. These issues highlight the difficult 
trade-offs that are faced by the policy maker in designing such a program and once again demand 
careful consideration prior to implementation.  
Emission offset bank 
Under a system of emission offsets any emissions increase occurring as a result of new 
development or changed management practices must be offset by an equivalent reduction in 
emissions elsewhere in the same river system. Emission offset schemes are most commonly 
designed to maintain the total level of emissions in the river system at a constant level (otherwise 
known as no net increase) and are typically targeted at large point sources of emissions.  
As discussed earlier in this section, Perth has already significantly reduced nitrogen and 
phosphorus emissions from large point sources and the problem of water quality in the Swan-
Canning river system is mainly due to nonpoint source emissions. This may suggest that offset 
schemes are of little practical interest. This is not necessarily true. Offset schemes could also be 
designed so that increases in one set of nonpoint source emissions are offset by reductions in 
another set of nonpoint source emissions.
45 For instance, in Perth an offset scheme could be 
designed so that increases in nonpoint source emissions from urban residential development were 
                                                 
45 An emissions offset scheme targeted at small point sources in Perth also warrants further consideration. Small 
point sources include small to medium size industrial and commercial premises and intensive agricultural activities 
such as piggeries, poultry farms and market gardens (SRT 1999).  
31 
offset by reductions in agricultural nonpoint source emissions. The design of such a scheme, 
including the use of an offset bank, is discussed below. 
 
Urban Nonpoint Source Emissions Offset bank 
A number of management options are available to address the potential impact of increasing 
nonpoint source emissions from urban residential development in Perth. One such option is to 
prohibit any new developments that contribute increased emissions into the Swan-Canning river 
system. This appears to be the option favoured in the Swan-Canning Cleanup Program Action 
Plan (1999), which states that local government town planning schemes should ‘specifically 
eliminate uses that can contribute nutrients and sediments to watercourses and wetlands’ (SRT 
1999 p73). 
Eliminating emissions from urban residential development is not an easy task however. 
Indeed, even following a BMP approach that includes the incorporation of water-sensitive design 
principles in the design of stormwater drainage systems, the construction of detention basins, 
vegetated swales and artificial wetlands for nutrient stripping and programs to encourage more 
efficient fertiliser and water use, may not eliminate all nitrogen and phosphorus emissions (SRT 
1999). Moreover, undertaking all of these actions would be costly, particularly for developments 
in areas with poor drainage, steep slopes or less permeable soils (SRT 1999). 
Achieving similar reductions in nitrogen and phosphorus emissions elsewhere in the Swan-
Canning river system could potentially be achieved at a lower cost. In particular, simple 
management changes on farms in catchments such as Ellen Brook and the Southern River could 
potentially result in equivalent emissions reductions at a much lower cost. It is this cost 
differential which provides the platform for a nonpoint source emissions offset scheme in the 
Swan-Canning river system.  
The first stage in establishing an offset scheme is the development of legislation that would 
prohibit new urban residential development unless either: a) all nonpoint source emissions are 
eliminated on site; or b) any increase in emissions from the development is offset through 
equivalent emissions reductions elsewhere in the Swan-Canning river system. The decision on 
how to reduce emissions would be made by the developer based on comparing the costs of doing 
so on site with the costs of arranging for other emitters in the system, such as agricultural 
nonpoint sources, to undertake equivalent reductions. The legislation could also establish the 
rules of the offset program, including the types of offset actions that can be used, criteria for 
determining whether these actions have been successful, the areas where offset actions can be 
undertaken and the trading ratios that may apply (Morrison 2002). 
Offsets are typically undertaken on a bilateral basis, whereby the developer conducts their 
own search for the appropriate off site action and negotiates the terms of the offset contract with 
the other party. The costs associated with making bilateral offset transactions can be high, 
however, and threaten to erode much of the potential cost-savings associated with the offset. In 
extreme cases, the transaction costs may even outweigh these cost-savings.  
A system of offset banking, based on the wetland mitigation banking 
46 model used in the 
United States, offers a pragmatic solution. 
47 With an offset banking system, government or 
                                                 
46 In 2001, there were estimated to be over 200 operational wetland mitigation banks in the United States (Morrison 
2002).  
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approved private organisations undertake actions to reduce emissions. Based on the outcomes of 
these actions, a ‘bank’ of emission reduction credits is built up. Similar to the operation of the 
bilateral offset scheme the developer is presented with two options if they are to comply with the 
offset legislation. First, they can eliminate the emissions from the development by implementing 
on site management actions. Alternatively, they can allow the emissions from their development 
to increase unabated and purchase an equivalent amount of emission reduction credits from the 
offset bank.  
Offset banks offer a number of advantages over bilateral offset schemes. First, they 
significantly reduce transaction costs per unit of emissions reduction. This is achieved through 
the increased efficiency with which large offset organisations, whether public or private, are able 
to organise offset actions, compared to individual developers. Large organisations can bring 
together financial, planning and scientific expertise that is simply not available to developers (US 
Corps of Engineers et al 1995). Second, they may achieve reductions in emissions more 
effectively. Large projects, which may offer greater per dollar reductions in emissions than a 
number of small projects, may be undertaken by the owner of the offset bank to generate 
emission reduction credits.  Third, they provide for greater environmental certainty without 
slowing down applications for urban residential development (US Corps of Engineers et al 
1995). Credits generated in offset banks are based on the outcomes of activities that have already 
been completed meaning that development can proceed as soon as credits are purchased by the 
developer.  
The introduction of an urban residential development offset bank is not without its problems, 
however. One such problem relates to the way in which an offset scheme can contribute to 
localised impacts on water quality (otherwise known as ‘hotspots’). Hotspots would occur if 
nitrogen and phosphorus emissions increased beyond acceptable limits in certain catchments 
despite the total level of emissions in the system remaining unchanged. This would be a real 
concern in the Swan-Canning if the majority of emissions reductions were to be undertaken in 
semi-rural and rural catchments such as the Ellen Brook and Southern River while urban 
residential development was focused in other catchments. The risks of hotspots can be reduced 
through introducing distance ratios in to the offset scheme or through government review of each 
offset trade (Morrison 2002)
48. Distance ratios require greater reductions in emissions the further 
the offset project is away from the urban residential development. By doing so they encourage 
offset projects to be developed in closer proximity to the urban development.
49 
A second and far more important problem facing the successful implementation of an offset 
bank relates to how emissions from nonpoint sources can be reliably measured. The efficient 
operation of the offset bank is predicated on the ability of the government (or an approved 
private business) to estimate both the emissions loadings from new urban residential 
developments (the ‘debits’) and the ‘credits’ generated by emissions reductions from projects 
conducted by the owner of the offset bank (Morrison 2002). While there are no easy answers 
                                                                                                                                                              
47 The use of a brokerage service, provided by either the Government or private sector, is another option that could 
be introduced to reduce the costs associated with searching for an appropriate offset. 
48 The introduction of distance ratios would be expected to increase the market transaction costs. These increased 
costs would need to be traded-off against the reduced environmental risk of allowing free trade. 
49 While, reducing the risk of hotspots this would also limit the cost-savings generated by the offset bank. The 
impact of the distance ratio would need to be weighed up against the risk of ‘hotspots’ in the design of the offset 
bank.  
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here, it appears the best way forward involves the use of emission proxies. As discussed earlier, 
such proxies are currently not available in the Swan-Canning river system. Progress elsewhere, 
suggests that developing emission proxies for nonpoint source emissions is possible, however.
50 
Once these estimation tools have been refined and adapted to the conditions of the Swan-
Canning river system the practical application of a nonpoint source emissions offset bank would 
appear to warrant serious consideration. 
Conversion of nonpoint sources into point sources 
The economic instruments discussed in this section have all followed the conventional approach 
to addressing nonpoint source water pollution. That is, they have been based on either an 
emission proxy or on inputs and management actions that are correlated with the level of 
nonpoint source emissions. The success of the Grassland Area Farmers Tradable Loads Program 
(GAFTLP) in the San Joaquin Valley of California indicates that there may be an alternative 
management solution. The possibility of implementing a similar program in the Swan-Canning 
river system is discussed below. 
The consideration of a program similar to the GAFTLP is predicated on the physical ability 
to convert groups of nonpoint sources into point sources. For this to be achieved three key 
conditions must be met. First, that there is a system of main waterways that may be treated as 
point sources.  Second, that all (or at least a very high proportion) of emissions in the main 
waterways come from nonpoint sources. Third, that these nonpoint sources can be identified. 
The system of waterways in the Perth metropolitan area appears to satisfy the first of these 
conditions. A network of small local drains in urban catchments flow into a system of main 
drains.
51 These main drains ‘act as conduits which act to concentrate the nutrients from the 
drainage catchment into a single point source’ (Department of Environmental Protection 2001 
p26). In semi-rural and rural catchments a system of man-made and natural waterways flow into 
large brooks or rivers. These natural waterways act like the main drains in collecting the nutrients 
from the drainage catchment and effectively convert emissions from a large group of individual 
sources into a single point source. Based on the ability to measure catchment emissions in main 
drains and waterways, phosphorus and nitrogen load targets have been set for each of the thirty-
one catchments within the Swan-Canning River system (Robinson 2002). At this point in time, 
the nutrient concentrations in fifteen of these catchments (see Table 3 for full listing) are being 
monitored on a regular basis (SRT 1999).  
A recent study into the nature of nutrients in the fifteen monitored catchments indicates that 
the main source of nutrients varies considerably from one catchment to the next and that nutrients 
in just six of the catchments were found to come predominantly from nonpoint sources 
(Jakowyna 2002). 
52 Of these six catchments, the Ellen Brook and Southern River are major 
contributors of emissions to the Swan-Canning river system, while the Avon River, Jane Brook, 
Upper Canning River and Yule Brook are all minor contributors (see Table 3). The study also 
indicated that matching emissions from individual sources (both point and nonpoint) with 
nutrient concentrations in distinct waterways and main drains is still an uncertain exercise. 
                                                 
50 Spreadsheet based tools have been used in Georgia in the United States to estimate emissions from new urban 
developments (Morrison 2002). 
51 Over 2500 kilometres of small surface and sub-surface drains are connected to a 300 kilometres long main drain 
system (SRT 1999). 
52 Nutrients in other catchments were found to come predominantly from a single point source, a mix of sources or 
from sub-surface and groundwater flows (Jakowyna 2002).  
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Indeed, ‘with the exception of Ellen Brook, our understanding about specific nutrient transport 
processes in catchments is limited’ (Jakowyna 2002 p 72). 
So it appears that although groups of individual nutrient sources in the Swan-Canning river 
system can be converted into ‘point sources’, in few instances are the sources predominantly 
nonpoint and, perhaps more importantly, the links between individual sources and measurable 
nutrient concentrations in main drains and waterways remains uncertain (Ellen Brook excepted).  
This indicates that a system based on the GAFTLP is not currently suitable in the Swan-Canning 
River system.  
Research into the movement of emissions from individual sources into main drains and 
waterways is constantly developing, however, and it is feasible that in a number of years these 
links will be much clearer. In preparation for that day, a number of authorities including the 
Department of Environmental Protection have already began investigating the potential for 
licensing nutrient loads from main drains in the Swan-Canning river system. Licensing could 
also potentially be extended to natural waterways, such as Ellen Brook and the Southern River.  
By introducing licensed emissions from main drains and waterways in the Swan-Canning 
river system each catchment is essentially treated as a single point source. By doing so, economic 
instruments typically used to manage point source water emissions may be considered. Emission 
charges could be applied to the authority responsible for water quality in each catchment based 
on the nutrient loads in main drains and waterways.
53 Alternatively, a system of tradable 
emission permits could be introduced. While it is emissions from each of the fifteen catchments 
being capped, rather than individual point sources, the operation of the instrument would remain 
much the same. Whether there would be sufficient depth in the market 
54 or the required 
differential in marginal abatement costs between catchments for the instrument to deliver 
efficiency gains is uncertain. These economic considerations, whilst being important, are not the 
limiting factor in the applicability of this approach to nonpoint source emissions in the Swan-
Canning river system, however. Indeed, they are dwarfed by a number of institutional challenges. 
The greatest barriers to the introduction of catchment based emission charges or tradable 
emission permits are institutional. For either emission charges or a tradable emissions permit 
scheme to operate effectively, the point source polluter (in this case the authority responsible for 
catchment wide emissions) has to be able to control their level of emissions. In terms of the 
Swan-Canning river system this could, for example, be achieved if a catchment authority was 
responsible both for the level of emissions in the main drain or waterway and is able to undertake 
catchment level pollution abatement (such as engineering works or BMP incentive payments). 
The system that currently exists in the Swan-Canning river system is far removed from this 
model. 
Under current institutional and legislative arrangements the Western Australian Water 
Corporation is responsible for the management of the main drain (‘point source’) system. Under 
their current operating license the Water Corporation faces no quality requirements for the water 
in the main drain system (Robinson 2002). Local governments are responsible for the extensive 
network of smaller drains that flow into the Water Corporations main drains.
55 Meanwhile the 
                                                 
53 This approach has been suggested by the Department of Environmental Protection (2001). 
54 There are just fifteen potential participants and most easily meeting current water quality requirements. 
55 28 local Government areas in the Swan-Canning river system are responsible for around 80 per cent of the total 
drainage infrastructure in Perth (Robinson 2002). Main drains, operated by the Water Corporation account for the 
remaining 20 per cent.  
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responsibility for strategic drainage planning and water quality in the Swan-Canning river system 
rests with the Department of Environment and Water (DEW). 
56  
For any economic instrument based on the level of emissions from ‘point source’ main 
drains and waterways to work, considerable institutional change would be required. At the 
extreme, new independent catchment based authorities responsible for drainage management and 
water quality could be created. Stripping the Water Corporation, DEW and local governments of 
their current responsibilities would face massive resistance, however. Moreover the costs of 
making such a significant institutional and legislative change (including policy transaction costs) 
would be extremely large. Alternatively, overall responsibility for coordinating drainage 
management in Perth could be placed with either the Water Corporation or local governments 
(Gunningham et al 2002). The Water Corporation is well placed from a statutory and 
administrative viewpoint to undertake this role and the organisational model could be closely 
based on those used in Melbourne and Sydney (Gunningham et al 2002). Local Governments 
would face far greater administrative and coordination challenges in managing the entire 
drainage system (Gunningham et al 2002). Moreover, it is understood that local government is be 
resistant to taking on any additional responsibility for drainage services (Robinson 2002).  
While there is now widespread recognition that changes are required to enable the proper 
planning and management of drainage at the catchment level, it is clear that there is very little 
agreement between key stakeholders as to what these changes should be and how they should 
proceed (Robinson 2002). Ultimately it must be conceded that even if it were physically possible 
to convert groups of individual polluters into point sources, the current institutional settings 
simply do not lend themselves to such an approach. Furthermore, any change in institutional and 
legislative settings associated with the creation of a more favourable drainage model are unlikely 
to come easily. Catchment authorities in the Swan-Canning river system, with the power and 
finances to respond to economic incentives provided by either emission charges or tradable 
emission permits, remain a pipe dream.  
7.  Conclusion 
The management of nonpoint source water pollution presents an immense challenge to 
economists and policy makers alike. A complex array of physical, economic, political and 
institutional barriers currently lie between theoretically appealing textbook economic 
prescriptions and their transition into successful real-world solutions. At the same time current 
policy approaches to the management of nonpoint water pollution are failing to deliver the 
desired improvements in water quality and calls for more cost-effective economic solutions are 
increasing. 
This places economists in a precarious position. There is undoubtedly a strong urge to 
replace existing measures with economic solutions that, at least on paper, look to be both more 
economically efficient and environmentally effective. These urges need to be tempered. Far 
greater attention needs to be given to where and when it is appropriate to apply specific 
economic instruments. It is clear that no single instrument provides a universal solution to all 
environmental problems – each case must be decided on its own merit. As Stavins (2001) puts it: 
                                                 
56 DEW is an amalgamation of the Department of Environmental Protection, the Waters and Rivers Commission and 
the Swan River Trust. The amalgamation of these agencies was announced in October 2001 but is yet to be 
completed.  
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‘No particular form of government intervention, no individual policy instrument – whether market 
based or conventional – is appropriate for all environmental problems. Which instrument is best in any 
given situation depends on a variety of characteristics of the environmental problem, and the social, 
political, and economic context in which it is being regulated. There is clearly no policy panacea’ p 15 
Greater attention also has to be paid to designing economic instruments in a way that retains 
their theoretical essence whilst also managing to gain the stakeholder and political support 
necessary for their implementation. Past experience suggests that it is simply unrealistic to try 
and apply theoretically ideal economic instruments to real-world water pollution problems. The 
obstacles are simply too great. Equally however, there seems little point in applying instruments 
that bear virtually no resemblance to their ideal state. Such instruments often fail to deliver 
significant environmental improvement and in some cases may even end up costing more than 
alternative measures, including regulation.  
Instrument design also needs to recognise underlying beliefs about property rights and the 
importance of political considerations up-front. Innovative solutions, which aim to satisfy the 
demands of our elected officials whilst also providing for environmental improvement at a lower 
cost than alternative measures are required. Some degree of concession will of course be 
necessary. And while these may lead to more gradual environmental improvement or less than 
optimal economic outcomes, it will represent a positive step forward. Surely some environmental 
gain and some cost-savings are better than none at all! 
Finally, transaction costs need to be considered in any comparison of alternative measures. 
For far too long analysis of the potential cost-savings offered by economic instruments compared 
to regulatory or suasive approaches has failed to consider the policy and market transaction costs 
associated with the design, implementation and ongoing operation of the economic instrument.  
It is apparent that once these considerations are taken into account, many of the economic 
instruments that have arisen out of the economic literature are destined to never see the light of 
day. They are simply too complex or impractical and in some cases face insurmountable political 
barriers. Moreover, the benefits that result from their introduction may be insufficient to justify 
the associated costs. 
This is not to say that economic instruments should not be considered for the management of 
nonpoint source pollution. In many cases the introduction of economic instruments, such as 
auctioned BMP payments, BMP incentive charges and emission offset banks may be both more 
environmentally effective and more efficient that existing suasive measures or proposed 
regulatory regimes. Indeed, their appeal may be even greater for water quality problems in 
systems other than the Swan-Canning, including those associated with salinity.  
Despite their promise however, these instruments still remain unlikely to offer an entirely 
satisfactory economic, political or environmental solution. While offering more than most 
measures, they are certainly no magic bullet and the search for the holy grail of an economic 
instrument that can guarantee environmental and economic efficiency gains whilst also being 
politically palatable to key stakeholders must continue. 
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